CAPECattack pattern
CAPEC-51 Poison Web Service Registry
Very High
Official page ↗
- Abstraction
- Detailed
- Status
- Draft
- Likelihood of attack
- High
- Typical severity
- Very High
- CAPEC version
- 3.9
Description
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
Extended description
WS-Addressing is used to virtualize services, provide return addresses and other routing information, however, unless the WS-Addressing headers are protected they are vulnerable to rewriting. Content in a registry is deployed by the service provider. The registry in an SOA or Web Services system can be accessed by the service requester via UDDI or other protocol.
Execution flow
1. [Explore] [Find a target SOA or Web Service] The adversary must first indentify a target SOA or Web Service.
2. [Experiment] [Determine desired outcome] Because poisoning a web service registry can have different outcomes, the adversary must decide how they wish to effect the webservice.
3. [Experiment] [Determine if a malicious service needs to be created] If the adversary wishes to redirect requests or responses, they will need to create a malicious service to redirect to.
4. [Exploit] [Poison Web Service Registry] Based on the desired outcome, poison the web service registry. This is done by altering the data at rest in the registry or uploading malicious content by spoofing a service provider.
Prerequisites
• The attacker must be able to write to resources or redirect access to the service registry.
Skills required
• [Low] To identify and execute against an over-privileged system interface
Consequences
• Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability: Execute Unauthorized Commands
• Confidentiality: Read Data
• Integrity: Modify Data
Mitigations
• Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
• Design: Harden registry server and file access permissions
• Implementation: Implement communications to and from the registry using secure protocols
Related
Child of · CAPEC (1)
- CAPEC-203 Manipulate Registry Information attack pattern