CVEvulnerability
CVE-2024-35871
7.1 HIGH
Official page ↗
- Status
- Analyzed
- Published
- 2024-05-19
- Last modified
- 2026-06-17
- Assigner
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- CVSS 3.1 ([email protected])
- 7.1 HIGH — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Affected configurations
• linux linux kernel (>= 4.15 < 5.10.216)
• linux linux kernel (>= 5.11 < 5.15.154)
• linux linux kernel (>= 5.16 < 6.1.85)
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.2 < 6.6.26)
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.7 < 6.8.5)
• linux linux kernel 6.9
• debian debian linux 10.0
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00effef72c98294edb1efa87ffa0f6cfb61b36a4 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9abc3e6f1116adb7a2d4fbb8ce20c37916976bf5 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8dcba0691b8e42bddb61aab201e4d918a08e5d9 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dff6072124f6df77bfd36951fbd88565746980ef Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6583444d7e78dae750798552b65a2519ff3ca84 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00effef72c98294edb1efa87ffa0f6cfb61b36a4 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9abc3e6f1116adb7a2d4fbb8ce20c37916976bf5 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8dcba0691b8e42bddb61aab201e4d918a08e5d9 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dff6072124f6df77bfd36951fbd88565746980ef Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6583444d7e78dae750798552b65a2519ff3ca84 Patch
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html Third Party Advisory