CVEvulnerability
CVE-2024-42318
5.5 MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Status
- Modified
- Published
- 2024-08-17
- Last modified
- 2026-08-04
- Assigner
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- CVSS 3.1 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
- 8.8 HIGH — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CVSS 3.1 ([email protected])
- 5.5 MEDIUM — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
landlock: Don't lose track of restrictions on cred_transfer
When a process' cred struct is replaced, this _almost_ always invokes
the cred_prepare LSM hook; but in one special case (when
KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT updates the parent's credentials), the
cred_transfer LSM hook is used instead. Landlock only implements the
cred_prepare hook, not cred_transfer, so KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT causes
all information on Landlock restrictions to be lost.
This basically means that a process with the ability to use the fork()
and keyctl() syscalls can get rid of all Landlock restrictions on
itself.
Fix it by adding a cred_transfer hook that does the same thing as the
existing cred_prepare hook. (Implemented by having hook_cred_prepare()
call hook_cred_transfer() so that the two functions are less likely to
accidentally diverge in the future.)
Affected configurations
• linux linux kernel (>= 5.13 < 5.15.165)
• linux linux kernel (>= 5.16 < 6.1.103)
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.2 < 6.6.44)
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.7 < 6.10.3)
References
- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2566 Issue Tracking, Third Party Advisory
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d74fd54db0bd0c0c224bef0da8fc95ea9c9f36c Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16896914bace82d7811c62f3b6d5320132384f49 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39705a6c29f8a2b93cf5b99528a55366c50014d1 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/916c648323fa53b89eedb34a0988ddaf01406117 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b14cc2cf313bd29056fadbc8ecd7f957cf5791ff Patch
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Mailing List
- https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/08/17/2 Mailing List
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/08/17/2 Mailing List
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html lists.debian.org