CVEvulnerability

CVE-2025-38413

5.5 MEDIUM Published 2025-07-25 Modified 2026-07-30 Official page ↗
Status
Modified
Published
2025-07-25
Last modified
2026-07-30
Assigner
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
CVSS 3.1 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
7.7 HIGH — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
CVSS 3.1 ([email protected])
5.5 MEDIUM — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk, we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost to start placing data from hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len not hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in the first buffer can only be xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() not xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len like in the current check. This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum frame's length.

Affected configurations

• linux linux kernel (>= 6.11 < 6.12.37) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.13 < 6.15.6) • linux linux kernel 6.16

References