CVEvulnerability
CVE-2026-41583
9.3 CRITICAL
Official page ↗
- Status
- Analyzed
- Published
- 2026-05-08
- Last modified
- 2026-10-26
- Assigner
- [email protected]
- CVSS 4.0 ([email protected])
- 9.3 CRITICAL — CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- CVSS 3.1 ([email protected])
- 9.1 CRITICAL — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-573
Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.
Affected configurations
• zfnd zebra-script (< 5.0.2)
• zfnd zebrad (< 4.3.1)
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller weakness