CVE-2026-64014

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len) and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold. Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data() callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk. A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault. Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and x_len to data_len.

• linux linux kernel (>= 2.6.34 < 5.10.259) • linux linux kernel (>= 5.11 < 5.15.210) • linux linux kernel (>= 5.16 < 6.1.176) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.2 < 6.6.143) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.7 < 6.12.93) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.13 < 6.18.35) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.19 < 7.0.12) • linux linux kernel 7.1