CVE-2026-64046

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link: This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links. meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap: end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap] Skip the wrapping in this case. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain. Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.

• linux linux kernel (>= 5.4.14 < 5.5) • linux linux kernel (>= 5.5.1 < 5.10.258) • linux linux kernel (>= 5.11 < 5.15.209) • linux linux kernel (>= 5.16 < 6.1.175) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.2 < 6.6.142) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.7 < 6.12.92) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.13 < 6.18.34) • linux linux kernel (>= 6.19 < 7.0.11) • linux linux kernel 5.5 • linux linux kernel 7.1