CVEvulnerability
CVE-2026-64132
9.8 CRITICAL
Official page ↗
- Status
- Analyzed
- Published
- 2026-07-19
- Last modified
- 2026-08-13
- Assigner
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- CVSS 3.1 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
- 9.8 CRITICAL — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-416
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()
Reported by Sashiko:
In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the
skb's linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(),
which might reallocate the buffer:
if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr->opt_len))
goto drop;
/* Trace pointer may have changed */
trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)
+ optoff + sizeof(*hdr));
ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);
ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb->dev),
GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr->opt_len - 2);
If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom,
skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates
the skb's data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to
it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the
call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.
This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before
passing hdr->opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.
Affected configurations
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.9 < 6.12.92)
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.13 < 6.18.34)
• linux linux kernel (>= 6.19 < 7.0.11)
• linux linux kernel 7.1
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-416 Use After Free weakness
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24de676da63c1122d2c13b0d546238b66d1b4e62 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5af905aa8e91ff8d94572a1e089558f21dcf24ed Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/769723124b7c3b2bfea4cf68ad292698b87c8d01 Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e46e6bc97fb1f339730ff1ba74267fbf48e7a422 Patch