CVEvulnerability
CVE-2026-98550
7.5 HIGH
Official page ↗
- Status
- Received
- Published
- 2026-10-18
- Last modified
- 2026-10-24
- Assigner
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- CVSS 3.1 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
- 7.5 HIGH — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow
Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked).
However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:
1. When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked
passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
all future group broadcasts on the socket.
2. During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender
transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt.
However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's
m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale
value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed
by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same
round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.
Fix this by:
- Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero.
- Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where
m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly
sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member
can acknowledge at most once per round.
Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member()
(where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does
not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed
in a separate patch.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12cc3a1eac5a2a06b67a7b85f0f48ff241a94d1b git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478fb08d0c2a53002a721d22b8d6681ec971d90f git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/507a27435b2bb1f22e3a3674f6a6553eb815021b git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80a9ccfc24d3776ef6753a57315e726475fac7d7 git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99cc2a62e07a44a22254d7beca9ef1f8ad886d0d git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b94a90651e1fa573c6ac6a5a6b269d5874df2c0 git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0e517961f09b9f60d338d1ea4e17aacdbf206f0 git.kernel.org
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edc6593c442278fceff0120e8cc58bc592168c35 git.kernel.org