CWE-1330 Remanent Data Readable after Memory Erase

Confidential information stored in memory circuits is readable or recoverable after being cleared or erased, i.e., there is data remanence.

• Confidentiality: Modify Memory, Read Memory — Data remanence occurs when stored memory content is not fully lost after a memory-clear or memory-erase operation. Confidential memory contents can still be readable through data remanence in the hardware. Confidential data are readable to untrusted agent.

• [Architecture and Design] • Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. • Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. • External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). • Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.

• Architecture or Design Review: • Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. • Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. • Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations. • Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation: • Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. • Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. • Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.

• CVE-2019-8575: Firmware Data Deletion Vulnerability in which a base station factory reset might not delete all user information. The impact of this enables a new owner of a used device that has been "factory-default reset" with a vulnerable firmware version can still retrieve, at least, the previous owner's wireless network name, and the previous owner's wireless security (such as WPA2) key. This issue was addressed with improved, data deletion.