CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

• Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart — The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could trick a client into making an unintentional request to the web server via a URL, image load, XmlHttpRequest, etc., which would then be treated as an authentic request from the client - effectively performing any operations as the victim, leading to an exposure of data, unintended code execution, etc. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges.

• [Architecture and Design] Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45] • [Implementation] Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script. • [Architecture and Design] Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332] • [Architecture and Design] Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation. • [Architecture and Design] Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331] • [Architecture and Design] Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change. • [Implementation] Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

• Manual Analysis: This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention. Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis. • Automated Static Analysis: CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link. • Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis • Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies • Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: • Web Application Scanner • Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: • Fuzz Tester • Framework-based Fuzzer • Manual Static Analysis - Source Code: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections) • Automated Static Analysis - Source Code: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: • Source code Weakness Analyzer • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer • Architecture or Design Review: According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.) • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

• CVE-2004-1703: Add user accounts via a URL in an img tag • CVE-2004-1995: Add user accounts via a URL in an img tag • CVE-2004-1967: Arbitrary code execution by specifying the code in a crafted img tag or URL • CVE-2004-1842: Gain administrative privileges via a URL in an img tag • CVE-2005-1947: Delete a victim's information via a URL or an img tag • CVE-2005-2059: Change another user's settings via a URL or an img tag • CVE-2005-1674: Perform actions as administrator via a URL or an img tag • CVE-2009-3520: modify password for the administrator • CVE-2009-3022: CMS allows modification of configuration via CSRF attack against the administrator • CVE-2009-3759: web interface allows password changes or stopping a virtual machine via CSRF