GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-23wf-92cp-8pcj Echo has Arbitrary Scheme Injection in WWWRedirect/NonWWWRedirect Middlewares via X-Forwarded-Proto
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-118658
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-601
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-28
Affected packages
• Go github.com/labstack/echo/v5: < 5.1.1 → fixed in 5.1.1
• Go github.com/labstack/echo/v4: < 4.15.2 → fixed in 4.15.2
Description
Summary
The `c.Scheme()` method in Echo (`context.go:162-181`) trusts the `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Protocol`, and `X-Url-Scheme` request headers without validating that the value is `http` or `https`. The `WWWRedirect()` and `NonWWWRedirect()` middlewares use this unsanitized scheme to construct redirect URLs, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary URI schemes into the `Location` response header.
Affected Components
• `context.go:162-181` - `Scheme()` method returns attacker-controlled value verbatim
• `middleware/redirect.go:172-184` - `redirectWWW`/`redirectNonWWW` use unsanitized scheme
Proof of Concept
```
GET /path HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
X-Forwarded-Proto: javascript
Response:
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: javascript://www.example.com/path
```
Confirmed injectable schemes: `javascript`, `data`, `vbscript`, `file`, `ftp`, `ssh`, `telnet`, `gopher`.
Only `WWWRedirect()` and `NonWWWRedirect()` (and `WithConfig` variants) are affected. `HTTPSRedirect`, `HTTPSWWWRedirect`, `HTTPSNonWWWRedirect` are NOT affected (they hardcode `https://`).
Impact
• Open redirect to arbitrary scheme URLs when app is not behind a proxy that strips `X-Forwarded-Proto`
• Cache poisoning when behind a CDN that caches redirect responses keyed by path
• `file://` scheme injection could trigger file access in some browser configurations
Suggested Fix
Whitelist scheme in `c.Scheme()` to only return `http` or `https`:
```go
func (c *Context) Scheme() string {
if c.IsTLS() {
return "https"
}
if scheme := c.request.Header.Get(HeaderXForwardedProto); scheme != "" {
scheme = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(scheme))
if scheme == "https" {
return "https"
}
}
return "http"
}
```
Disclosure
Source code review, manually verified with actual HTTP server. Tested on Echo v5.0.4 (latest master).
Patches
Fixed in `github.com/labstack/echo/v5` v5.1.1 and `github.com/labstack/echo/v4` v4.15.2. `Context.Scheme()` now accepts only `http`, `https`, `ws` or `wss` from the `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Protocol` and `X-Url-Scheme` headers, and falls back to `http` for any other value (#2953).
Workarounds
Upgrade to a patched version. If you cannot upgrade, have your edge proxy overwrite or remove the `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Protocol` and `X-Url-Scheme` request headers.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-118658 Echo is a Go web framework. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site weakness
References
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-23wf-92cp-8pcj web
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/2953 web
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/ca4f38a474302aabee93c66bdd0052359882e181 web
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/d1d8ad3f99dd9b80542cd0c357d56a8916c515df web
- https://github.com/labstack/echo package
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.15.2 web
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.1.1 web