GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)

• npm @sync-in/server: < 2.4.1 → fixed in 2.4.1

Summary validateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword(): async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTH_SCOPE): Promise { let user: UserModel try { user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false) } catch (e) { ... } if (!user) { this.logger.warn(...) return null // { if (!hash) { // No hash, waste time for time-based attacks await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH) return false } return await bcrypt.compare(password, hash) } The problem is that this protection only runs when comparePassword() is actually invoked with a falsy hash. Because validateUser() short-circuits with return null as soon as findUser() comes back empty, the "account doesn't exist" path skips all cryptographic work entirely, while the "account exists, wrong password" path always performs a real bcrypt comparison (cost factor 10, ~100ms+). The two outcomes are trivially distinguishable by response time. There's already a published advisory in this repo for "Username Enumeration via Timing Attack" - this looks like the same underlying issue surfacing through a different call path (the early return in validateUser()) that the existing fix (the dummy-hash branch in comparePassword()) doesn't actually reach, rather than a brand new vulnerability class. Impact Any unauthenticated client can determine whether a given username/email is a valid account on the instance by timing POST /api/auth/login: • Non-existent login: near-instant rejection (no bcrypt call). • Existing login (regardless of password correctness): consistently slower due to a real bcrypt comparison. This enables efficient enumeration of valid accounts, which can then be used to focus credential-stuffing, password-spraying, or phishing against confirmed-valid targets. Proof of Concept Verified with the actual comparePassword() logic and the real DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH constant copied verbatim from backend/src/common/functions.ts, using the project's own bcryptjs dependency (no mocking of bcrypt itself): Avg time for "login does not exist" path (validateUser returns null, no bcrypt call): 0.00 ms Avg time for "login exists, wrong password" path (real bcrypt.compare runs): 114.90 ms Difference: 114.90 ms (ratio: ~58923x) The "not found" path reproduces validateUser()'s exact early return (no call into comparePassword); the "wrong password" path reproduces logUser()'s real call into comparePassword(password, user.password). The gap is large enough to be trivially observable over a real network, even accounting for jitter. Reachable endpoint: POST /api/auth/login, guarded only by AuthLocalGuard (Passport local strategy invoking validateUser()), no authentication required. Suggested fix Make validateUser() always pass through comparePassword()'s timing-equalized path, even when no user is found, e.g.: if (!user) { await comparePassword(password, null) // burns the same time as a real comparison return null } so the "account not found" and "account found, wrong password" branches take statistically indistinguishable time.