GHSA-2cpx-427x-q2c6 CHECK-fail in AddManySparseToTensorsMap

• PyPI tensorflow: < 2.1.4 → fixed in 2.1.4 • PyPI tensorflow: >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3 → fixed in 2.2.3 • PyPI tensorflow: >= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3 → fixed in 2.3.3 • PyPI tensorflow: >= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2 → fixed in 2.4.2 • PyPI tensorflow-cpu: < 2.1.4 → fixed in 2.1.4 • PyPI tensorflow-cpu: >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3 → fixed in 2.2.3 • PyPI tensorflow-cpu: >= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3 → fixed in 2.3.3 • PyPI tensorflow-cpu: >= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2 → fixed in 2.4.2 • PyPI tensorflow-gpu: < 2.1.4 → fixed in 2.1.4 • PyPI tensorflow-gpu: >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3 → fixed in 2.2.3 • PyPI tensorflow-gpu: >= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3 → fixed in 2.3.3 • PyPI tensorflow-gpu: >= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2 → fixed in 2.4.2

Impact An attacker can trigger a denial of service via a `CHECK`-fail in `tf.raw_ops.AddManySparseToTensorsMap`: ```python import tensorflow as tf import numpy as np sparse_indices = tf.constant(530, shape=[1, 1], dtype=tf.int64) sparse_values = tf.ones([1], dtype=tf.int64) shape = tf.Variable(tf.ones([55], dtype=tf.int64)) shape[:8].assign(np.array([855, 901, 429, 892, 892, 852, 93, 96], dtype=np.int64)) tf.raw_ops.AddManySparseToTensorsMap(sparse_indices=sparse_indices, sparse_values=sparse_values, sparse_shape=shape) ``` This is because the implementation takes the values specified in `sparse_shape` as dimensions for the output shape: ```cc TensorShape tensor_input_shape(input_shape->vec()); ``` The `TensorShape` constructor uses a `CHECK` operation which triggers when `InitDims` returns a non-OK status. ```cc template TensorShapeBase::TensorShapeBase(gtl::ArraySlice dim_sizes) { set_tag(REP16); set_data_type(DT_INVALID); TF_CHECK_OK(InitDims(dim_sizes)); } ``` In our scenario, this occurs when adding a dimension from the argument results in overflow: ```cc template Status TensorShapeBase::InitDims(gtl::ArraySlice dim_sizes) { ... Status status = Status::OK(); for (int64 s : dim_sizes) { status.Update(AddDimWithStatus(internal::SubtleMustCopy(s))); if (!status.ok()) { return status; } } } template Status TensorShapeBase::AddDimWithStatus(int64 size) { ... int64 new_num_elements; if (kIsPartial && (num_elements() < 0 || size < 0)) { new_num_elements = -1; } else { new_num_elements = MultiplyWithoutOverflow(num_elements(), size); if (TF_PREDICT_FALSE(new_num_elements < 0)) { return errors::Internal("Encountered overflow when multiplying ", num_elements(), " with ", size, ", result: ", new_num_elements); } } ... } ``` This is a legacy implementation of the constructor and operations should use `BuildTensorShapeBase` or `AddDimWithStatus` to prevent `CHECK`-failures in the presence of overflows. Patches We have patched the issue in GitHub commit 69c68ecbb24dff3fa0e46da0d16c821a2dd22d7c. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range. For more information Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions. Attribution This vulnerability has been reported by Yakun Zhang and Ying Wang of Baidu X-Team.