GHSA-2ppx-66jv-wpw5 Windmill: Resource-scoped API tokens can read script contents outside their allowed path via scripts/list_search

• crates.io windmill-api: < 1.715.0 → fixed in 1.715.0

Summary A resource-scoped API token can read script contents outside its allowed path scope via `GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search`. This appears to be a remaining variant of the scoped-token authorization class previously addressed for other endpoints. The route-level scope middleware validates the token domain/action, but does not enforce the resource/path segment of a scope. `scripts/list_search` then returns script `path` and `content` for scripts in the workspace without applying per-row path filtering against the token scopes. Affected endpoint `GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search` Affected versions Confirmed in the current public repository code and believed to affect the latest published release at the time of review: `<= 1.714.1` Patched version: unknown. Details Windmill supports scoped API tokens with scopes in the format: `{domain}:{action}[:{resource}]` The parser supports resource-scoped values such as: `scripts:read:f/allowed/*` and the codebase contains helpers for resource matching, including wildcard matching. However, the route-level scope check used for requests with scoped API tokens only validates the route domain and action. It does not compare the token's resource/path restriction against the requested route or against the rows returned by list endpoints. For `scripts/list_search`, the handler returns `path` and `content` for scripts in the workspace: `SELECT path, content from script WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND archived = false LIMIT $2` There is no additional `check_scopes(...)` call in the handler and no per-row filtering based on the token's resource/path scope. As a result, a token intended to read only scripts under one path prefix may be able to read script contents from unrelated paths in the same workspace. Source-level reproduction 1. Create or use a workspace containing at least two scripts: • `f/allowed/script_a` • `f/private/script_b` 2. Create a scoped API token intended to read only the allowed path: `scripts:read:f/allowed/*` 3. Use that token to call: `GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search` 4. Expected behavior: The response should include only scripts matching the token's resource scope, e.g. only scripts under: `f/allowed/*` 5. Actual behavior from source review: The route-level scope check accepts the request as `scripts:read`, and the handler returns script `path` and `content` for scripts in the workspace without filtering the rows by the token's resource scope. This can expose script source code from paths outside the token's intended scope. Impact A user or integration holding a path-restricted `scripts:read:{resource}` token may be able to read script contents from unrelated scripts in the same workspace. Depending on how scripts are used, this may disclose: • internal automation logic, • integration details, • business logic, • inline configuration, • accidentally hardcoded secrets or credentials. This does not require admin privileges. It requires possession of a valid scoped API token for the workspace. Related context This appears related to the broader class of issues where route-level token scope enforcement validates domain/action but not the resource/path portion of the scope. Similar scoped-token issues appear to have been fixed for other endpoints, such as resources/variables listing and job preview/run paths, but I did not find an equivalent fix for `scripts/list_search`. Suggested fix Apply resource/path scope enforcement to `scripts/list_search`. Possible approaches: 1. Add explicit handler-level authorization similar to per-resource endpoints. 2. Filter returned rows so that a scoped token only receives scripts whose `path` is included by at least one `scripts:read:{resource}` scope. 3. Add regression tests for: • `scripts:read:f/allowed/*` cannot see `f/private/script_b`, • broad `scripts:read` still sees all accessible scripts, • unscoped tokens preserve current behavior, • filter-tag-only tokens preserve current compatibility behavior. A more defensive long-term fix would be to make route-level scope enforcement aware of resource/path restrictions where the route contains a concrete resource path, while list endpoints should apply per-row filtering.