GHSA-2r4p-jpmg-48f4 Open WebUI has an LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass

• PyPI open-webui: < 0.9.0 → fixed in 0.9.0

LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass Affected Component LDAP authentication endpoint: • `backend/open_webui/routers/auths.py` (lines 468-477, user bind with empty password) • `backend/open_webui/models/auths.py` (lines 58-60, `LdapForm` model) Affected Versions Current main branch (commit `6fdd19bf1`) and likely all versions with LDAP authentication support. Description The LDAP authentication endpoint does not validate that the submitted password is non-empty before performing a Simple Bind against the LDAP server. Per RFC 4513 Section 5.1.2, a Simple Bind with a valid DN and an empty password constitutes an "unauthenticated simple authentication" — many LDAP servers (including OpenLDAP in default configuration and some Active Directory setups) return success (resultCode 0) for this operation. The `LdapForm` Pydantic model accepts `password: str` with no minimum length constraint, so an empty string passes validation. The subsequent `Connection.bind()` call succeeds on vulnerable LDAP servers, and the application issues a full session token for the target user. ```python models/auths.py:58-60 — no min_length on password class LdapForm(BaseModel): user: str password: str auths.py:469-477 — empty password reaches LDAP bind connection_user = Connection( server, user_dn, form_data.password, # can be "" auto_bind='NONE', authentication='SIMPLE', ) if not await asyncio.to_thread(connection_user.bind): raise HTTPException(400, 'Authentication failed.') If bind succeeds (which it does with empty password on many servers), execution continues and a full session token is issued ``` CVSS 3.1 Breakdown | Metric | Value | Rationale | |--------|-------|-----------| | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via the LDAP login endpoint | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single request with an empty password field | | Privileges Required | None (N) | No prior authentication needed | | User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the application's authentication boundary | | Confidentiality | High (H) | Full access to victim's account data — chats, files, API keys, settings | | Integrity | High (H) | Can modify victim's data, settings, send messages as victim | | Availability | None (N) | No direct denial of service | Attack Scenario 1. LDAP authentication is enabled on the Open WebUI instance. 2. The underlying LDAP server accepts unauthenticated simple binds (OpenLDAP default, some AD configs). 3. Attacker sends: ``` POST /api/v1/auths/ldap {"user": "admin_username", "password": ""} ``` 4. The app DN bind succeeds normally (line 366), finds the target user via LDAP search. 5. The user bind (line 469-477) sends a Simple Bind with the target's DN and an empty password. 6. The LDAP server returns success for the unauthenticated bind. 7. `authenticate_user_by_email` (line 507) issues a full session token for the target user. 8. Attacker has complete access to the victim's account. Impact • Complete authentication bypass — any LDAP user account can be taken over without knowing the password • Includes admin accounts if they authenticate via LDAP • No rate limiting on the LDAP endpoint (unlike the password signin endpoint) • Zero interaction required from the victim Preconditions • LDAP must be enabled (`ENABLE_LDAP=True`, disabled by default) • The LDAP server must accept unauthenticated simple binds with empty passwords (OpenLDAP default behavior, configurable on AD) • Attacker must know a valid LDAP username