GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-2vc4-c4r6-p6v6 OpenNext Cloudflare: Cache interception can bypass middleware protection for encoded paths

HIGH Published 2026-10-15 Modified 2026-10-15 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-100409
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
@opennextjs/cloudflare
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-177, CWE-180
Reviewed
2026-10-15

Affected packages

• npm @opennextjs/cloudflare: >= 0.3.0, < 1.20.2 → fixed in 1.20.2

Description

Summary When cache interception is enabled, `@opennextjs/cloudflare` can interpret percent-encoded paths differently during middleware matching and cache lookup. An encoded request may fail to match authorization middleware, then be decoded into the cache key of a protected route. The cached response may consequently be returned without invoking the middleware. `enableCacheInterception` is disabled by default. Impact A remote unauthenticated attacker may retrieve cached content from routes intended to be protected by middleware. An application is affected when it: • explicitly enables `enableCacheInterception`; • relies on middleware for access control; and • has a matching cached route. Details Middleware matching previously used the encoded request pathname, while cache interception decoded the pathname before selecting a cache entry. For example, consider an application with: • middleware matcher `/admin/:path*`; • middleware returning `401 Authentication required` for `/admin`; • a statically generated, cached `/admin` route; and • cache interception enabled: ```ts export default defineCloudflareConfig({ incrementalCache: staticAssetsIncrementalCache, enableCacheInterception: true, }); ``` An attacker can request: ```http GET /%61dmin ``` The encoded pathname does not match `/admin/:path*`, so the authorization middleware is not invoked. Cache interception then decodes `%61dmin` to `admin` and may return the cached `/admin` response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK x-opennext-cache: HIT Protected content ``` Malformed paths exposed an additional inconsistency. For example: ```http GET /%61dmin/%ZZ ``` The previous implementation decoded each segment independently. It decoded `%61dmin` to `admin` but retained the malformed `%ZZ` segment, allowing cache lookup to continue using a partially decoded pathname. Patches The fix aligns encoded-path handling across middleware matching and cache lookup, and rejects malformed paths instead of partially decoding them. See the upstream fixes in opennextjs-aws#1199 and opennextjs-aws#1200. Users should upgrade to `@opennextjs/[email protected]` or later. Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible for an application: 1. Disable cache interception by removing `enableCacheInterception: true`. 2. Enforce authorization inside protected route handlers rather than relying exclusively on middleware. 3. Reject encoded paths for protected routes at a trusted proxy before they reach the Worker. Adding individual encoded matcher variants is not a complete workaround because pathnames can have multiple equivalent encodings.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-100409 OpenNext Cloudflare is an open Next.js adapter for Cloudflare. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-177 Improper Handling of URL Encoding (Hex Encoding) weakness
  • CWE-180 Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize weakness

References