GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-2vc4-c4r6-p6v6 OpenNext Cloudflare: Cache interception can bypass middleware protection for encoded paths
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-100409
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- @opennextjs/cloudflare
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-177, CWE-180
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-15
Affected packages
• npm @opennextjs/cloudflare: >= 0.3.0, < 1.20.2 → fixed in 1.20.2
Description
Summary
When cache interception is enabled, `@opennextjs/cloudflare` can interpret percent-encoded paths differently during middleware matching and cache lookup.
An encoded request may fail to match authorization middleware, then be decoded into the cache key of a protected route. The cached response may consequently be returned without invoking the middleware.
`enableCacheInterception` is disabled by default.
Impact
A remote unauthenticated attacker may retrieve cached content from routes intended to be protected by middleware.
An application is affected when it:
• explicitly enables `enableCacheInterception`;
• relies on middleware for access control; and
• has a matching cached route.
Details
Middleware matching previously used the encoded request pathname, while cache interception decoded the pathname before selecting a cache entry.
For example, consider an application with:
• middleware matcher `/admin/:path*`;
• middleware returning `401 Authentication required` for `/admin`;
• a statically generated, cached `/admin` route; and
• cache interception enabled:
```ts
export default defineCloudflareConfig({
incrementalCache: staticAssetsIncrementalCache,
enableCacheInterception: true,
});
```
An attacker can request:
```http
GET /%61dmin
```
The encoded pathname does not match `/admin/:path*`, so the authorization middleware is not invoked. Cache interception then decodes `%61dmin` to `admin` and may return the cached `/admin` response:
```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
x-opennext-cache: HIT
Protected content
```
Malformed paths exposed an additional inconsistency. For example:
```http
GET /%61dmin/%ZZ
```
The previous implementation decoded each segment independently. It decoded `%61dmin` to `admin` but retained the malformed `%ZZ` segment, allowing cache lookup to continue using a partially decoded pathname.
Patches
The fix aligns encoded-path handling across middleware matching and cache lookup, and rejects malformed paths instead of partially decoding them. See the upstream fixes in opennextjs-aws#1199 and opennextjs-aws#1200.
Users should upgrade to `@opennextjs/[email protected]` or later.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible for an application:
1. Disable cache interception by removing `enableCacheInterception: true`.
2. Enforce authorization inside protected route handlers rather than relying exclusively on middleware.
3. Reject encoded paths for protected routes at a trusted proxy before they reach the Worker.
Adding individual encoded matcher variants is not a complete workaround because pathnames can have multiple equivalent encodings.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-100409 OpenNext Cloudflare is an open Next.js adapter for Cloudflare. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/security/advisories/GHSA-2vc4-c4r6-p6v6 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100409 advisory
- https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-aws/pull/1199 web
- https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-aws/pull/1200 web
- https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/commit/38ea40b669be272ddf09a7df7e70c69d0b57404b web
- https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare package
- https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/releases/tag/@opennextjs/[email protected] web