GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go

GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 Fiber's cache middleware default key generator ignores query string, causing response mix-up across distinct query parameters

MEDIUM Published 2026-04-28 Modified 2026-05-08 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-30246
Ecosystem
Go
Packages
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-200, CWE-436, CWE-524
Reviewed
2026-04-28

Affected packages

• Go github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3: < 3.2.0 → fixed in 3.2.0

Description

Summary Fiber cache middleware's default key generator uses only `c.Path()` and does not include the query string. As a result, requests like `/?id=1` and `/?id=2` can map to the same cache key and share the same cached response. This can cause response mix-up (cache poisoning-like behavior) for endpoints where response content depends on query parameters. Details Default configuration in cache middleware: • `KeyGenerator: func(c fiber.Ctx) string { return utils.CopyString(c.Path()) }` References: • https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/config.go#L90-L92 • https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/cache_test.go#L599-L621 The existing test demonstrates that when handler output depends on query parameter `id`, a second request with a different query still returns the first cached response (cache hit), confirming query is not part of the default cache key. PoC Minimal PoC: ```go package main import ( "log" "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3" "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3/middleware/cache" ) func main() { app := fiber.New() app.Use(cache.New()) // default config app.Get("/", func(c fiber.Ctx) error { return c.SendString(c.Query("id", "1")) }) log.Fatal(app.Listen(":3000")) } ``` Reproduction: 1. `GET /?id=1` • Cache miss • Response body: `1` 2. `GET /?id=2` • Cache hit • Response body: `1` (expected `2`) Local verification command used: ```bash go test ./middleware/cache -run Test_Cache_WithNoCacheRequestDirective -count=1 ``` Observed result: test passes, confirming this is current behavior. Impact • Responses that should vary by query parameters can be mixed between requests. • In real deployments, this may leak or corrupt user/tenant-specific content if query parameters influence context or data selection. • This is deployment-dependent but security-relevant, and not safe-by-default for query-variant responses. Suggested remediation • Change default cache key generation to include path + normalized query string (or canonicalized original URL). • Keep ability for custom key generators. • Add explicit documentation warning that path-only keying is unsafe for query-dependent responses.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

Weakness · CWE (3)

  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor weakness
  • CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict weakness
  • CWE-524 Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information weakness

References