GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j veraPDF Validation XXE via XFA

• Maven org.verapdf:validation-model: >= 1.17.35, < 1.30.2 → fixed in 1.30.2 • Maven org.verapdf:validation-model: >= 1.31.1, < 1.31.71 → fixed in 1.31.71 • Maven org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta: >= 1.17.35, < 1.30.2 → fixed in 1.30.2 • Maven org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta: >= 1.31.1, < 1.31.71 → fixed in 1.31.71

Summary Description An XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation. Details The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` within the `getdynamicRender()` method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF's /AcroForm dictionary, decodes the embedded XML stream, and parses it to extract the `` element value. The vulnerability stems from the use of a default-configured `DocumentBuilderFactory` to parse fully attacker-controlled XML: • The factory is created via `DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance()` with no security features enabled. disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities, external-parameter-entities, and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING are all left at their insecure defaults. • The input passed to `builder.parse()` is the decoded /XFA stream taken directly from the untrusted PDF. • The text content of the `` node is returned to the validation model. Note that the shipped PDF/UA-1 rule (`dynamicRender != 'required'`) consumes this value but does not echo it into the report output, so reliable exfiltration requires the out-of-band parameter-entity technique described under Impact rather than in-band reflection. Impact This impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module. Successful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF against the PDF/UA-1 profile (or via flavour auto-detection on a PDF that declares PDF/UA-1 conformance), since `getdynamicRender()` is invoked by the `dynamicRender != 'required'` rule in the bundled PDF/UA-1 profile. No additional configuration or operator action is required. Proposed Patch Harden the `DocumentBuilderFactory` in `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.