GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist
GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755 Symfony: IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS Omits IPv6 Transition Forms (6to4, NAT64, Teredo, IPv4-compatible): SSRF Bypass in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-48736
- Ecosystem
- Packagist
- Packages
- symfony/http-client, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/symfony
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-184, CWE-918
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-15
Affected packages
• Packagist symfony/http-client: >= 5.4.0, < 5.4.53 → fixed in 5.4.53
• Packagist symfony/http-foundation: >= 6.4.0, < 6.4.41 → fixed in 6.4.41
• Packagist symfony/http-foundation: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.13 → fixed in 7.4.13
• Packagist symfony/http-foundation: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.13 → fixed in 8.0.13
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 5.4.0, < 5.4.53 → fixed in 5.4.53
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 6.4.0, < 6.4.41 → fixed in 6.4.41
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.13 → fixed in 7.4.13
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.13 → fixed in 8.0.13
Description
Description
`Symfony\Component\HttpClient\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).
`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.
Real-world reachability of the embedded IPv4 depends on the deploy's IPv6 routing (6to4 tunnel interface, upstream NAT64 gateway, kernel handling of IPv4-compatible addresses), but the security boundary the decorator promises — the dispatch decision — is crossed regardless of whether the packet ultimately lands on the embedded IPv4.
Resolution
The private-subnet list now includes `::/96`, `2002::/16`, `2001::/32`, `64:ff9b::/96` and `64:ff9b:1::/48`. Blanket blocking of these prefixes matches the policy applied by Chromium and Mozilla's Private Network Access; server-side HTTPS APIs are not legitimately published on these prefixes.
The patches for this issue are available here for branch 5.4 and here for branch 6.4 (and forward-ported to 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1).
Credits
Symfony would like to thank tonghuaroot for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-48736 Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755 web
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/82765368cf74177c36613575182f168a2eb765b2 web
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/85b831555be8ea1f43bf01078afe87bc4c92f65e web
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/http-client/CVE-2026-48736.yaml web
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/http-foundation/CVE-2026-48736.yaml web
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-48736.yaml web
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony package
- https://symfony.com/cve-2026-48736 web