GHSA-39mp-545q-w789 OpenClaw: Non-owner command-authorized sender can change the owner-only `/send` session delivery policy

• npm openclaw: < 2026.3.24 → fixed in 2026.3.24

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release. Title Non-owner command-authorized sender can change the owner-only `/send` session delivery policy CWE CWE-285 Improper Authorization CVSS v3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L Base score: 5.4 (Medium) Severity Assessment Medium. This is a real owner-only authorization bypass, but the demonstrated impact is limited to persistent mutation of the current session’s delivery policy rather than direct code execution, sandbox escape, or cross-host compromise. Impact A non-owner sender who is allowed to run commands can invoke `/send on|off|inherit` and persistently change the current session’s `sendPolicy`, even though OpenClaw documents `/send` as owner-only. That lets a lower-trust participant: • disable reply delivery for the current session (`/send off`), suppressing future replies in that chat; • re-enable reply delivery (`/send on`) after the owner intentionally disabled it; • remove the session override (`/send inherit`). Affected Component Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`. Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag: • `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-session.ts:212-239` • `handleSendPolicyCommand(...)` checks only `params.command.isAuthorizedSender`. • when true, it mutates `params.sessionEntry.sendPolicy` and persists the session entry. Authorization behavior that makes this reachable: • `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:401-407` • `senderIsOwner` is computed separately from general command authorization. • `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:420-429` • command authorization can succeed even when `senderIsOwner === false`. • `src/auto-reply/command-auth.owner-default.test.ts:10-47` • existing coverage confirms a sender can be command-authorized while not treated as owner. Documented owner-only contract: • `docs/tools/slash-commands.md:112` • `/send on|off|inherit` is documented as owner-only. • `docs/concepts/session-tool.md:156` • `sendPolicy` is documented as settable via `sessions.patch` or owner-only `/send on|off|inherit`. Related privilege model: • `src/gateway/method-scopes.ts:131-133` • `sessions.patch` is admin-scoped, which reinforces that session-delivery-policy mutation is treated as privileged state. Version history: • The vulnerable handler exists in release history going back at least to commit `ea018a68ccb92dbc735bc1df9880d5c95c63ca35` (`refactor(auto-reply): split reply pipeline`). • Earliest released affected tag found: `v2026.1.14-1` • Latest released affected tag verified: `v2026.3.23` Technical Reproduction 1. Check out the shipped release tag `v2026.3.23`. 2. Configure a channel where: • a non-owner sender is allowed to run commands, for example through `commands.allowFrom`; • the owner identity is distinct, for example via `commands.ownerAllowFrom`. 3. Start or reuse a session with a live `sessionEntry` and `sessionStore`. 4. Send `/send off` as the non-owner but command-authorized sender. 5. Confirm the resolved command context has: • `isAuthorizedSender === true` • `senderIsOwner === false` 6. Observe that the handler still accepts the command, mutates `sessionEntry.sendPolicy`, and persists the session entry. Demonstrated Impact The vulnerable handler performs a real persistent session-state change: • `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-session.ts:232-238` • `/send inherit` deletes `sessionEntry.sendPolicy` • other modes assign `sessionEntry.sendPolicy = sendPolicyCommand.mode` • the handler then calls `persistSessionEntry(params)` The mutation is not gated by owner status, only by general command authorization. That changes subsequent delivery behavior for the current session, which matches the documented meaning of `sendPolicy`. Environment • Product: OpenClaw • Verified shipped tag: `v2026.3.23` • Shipped tag commit: `ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2` • Published GitHub release time: `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z` • Verification date: `2026-03-24` Duplicate Check Upon inspection there is no preexisting GHSA for `/send`. This is distinct from: • `GHSA-r7vr-gr74-94p8` • that advisory covered owner-only authorization bypasses for `/config` and `/debug`, not `/send`. This is the same authorization class, but a different privileged command surface that still lacks the owner check. In Scope Check This report is in scope under `SECURITY.md` because: • it does not rely on adversarial operators sharing one gateway host or config; • it does not rely on trusted local state tampering; • `SECURITY.md:151-152` explicitly says non-owner sender status matters for owner-only tools and commands; • `/send` is explicitly documented as owner-only, so this is a direct owner-only authorization bypass, not a complaint about normal shared-agent steering. This is therefore a concrete authorization flaw against a documented product boundary. Remediation Advice 1. Change `/send` to require owner status, not just command authorization. 2. Reuse the same owner-only rejection pattern already used by privileged command surfaces such as `/config`, `/debug`, and owner-only `/plugins` writes. 3. Add regression coverage for the exact case where: • a non-owner sender is command-authorized; • `/send` must still be rejected unless `senderIsOwner === true`. 4. Verify that the owner can still use `/send on|off|inherit` normally.