GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create() enables arbitrary file overwrite and arbitrary file read

• PyPI GitPython: < 3.1.57 → fixed in 3.1.57

Target: gitpython-developers/GitPython Tested: HEAD `07e80555` (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, `git version 2.50.1` Reported instances: 2 exploitable, from a sweep of 14 unguarded call sites Summary GitPython blocks dangerous git options through `Git.check_unsafe_options()`, gated per method by an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. That guard is applied per call site, so any API that forwards `kwargs` into a git command without calling it passes caller-controlled options straight to git. A mechanical sweep of every method that forwards `kwargs` into a `.git.(...)` call found 14 sites with no guard. Two reach a git option that takes a filesystem path: | # | Call site | git option | Impact | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | `IndexFile.checkout()` → `git checkout-index` | `--prefix=` | arbitrary file overwrite with repository-controlled content | | 2 | `TagReference.create()` → `git tag` | `-F ` / `--file=` | arbitrary file read, returned in-band | This is the same defect class already fixed in `Commit.count()` (GHSA-p538-c434-8v24), `Repo.archive()` and `Git.ls_remote()` (GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v). Both instances below are still present at HEAD. --- Instance 1 — `IndexFile.checkout()`: arbitrary file overwrite `git/index/base.py:1210` accepts `**kwargs` and forwards them with no guard: ```python def checkout(self, paths=None, force=False, fprogress=lambda *args: None, **kwargs): ... proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(*args, kwargs) # line 1331 ... proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(args, kwargs) # line 1349 ``` There is no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter and no `check_unsafe_options()` call in the method. `git checkout-index` accepts `--prefix=`, prepended to every output path. It is not confined to the working tree, so an absolute prefix writes tracked file contents anywhere the process can write, and `-f` overwrites what is already there. Reproduction ```python from git import Repo Repo("/path/to/repo").index.checkout(prefix="/tmp/target_dir/", a=True, f=True) ``` Observed (`poc/poc_checkout_index.py`) — no exception raised, files land outside the repository: ``` [ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised files written outside the repo: ['f.txt'] f.txt: 'hi\n' ``` Overwrite of a pre-existing file (`poc/poc_ci_overwrite.py`) — the victim file held `ORIGINAL-DO-NOT-CLOBBER\n` before the call: ``` [ALLOWED] no exception victim content now: 'hi\n' OVERWRITTEN: True ``` Why this rates High Both halves of the write are attacker-influenced: • Destination — the `prefix` kwarg. • Content — the bytes written are repository blobs, so anyone who can land a file in the repository (a pull-request branch, a mirrored or untrusted repository, an agent-cloned repository) controls exactly what is written. Commit a file named `authorized_keys`, `.bashrc`, `config` or `post-checkout`, choose the matching prefix (`~/.ssh/`, `~/`, `.git/hooks/`), and the write becomes code execution as the service account. For comparison within this project: GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc (arbitrary file overwrite via `git diff --output`) is rated High, and GHSA-p538-c434-8v24 (arbitrary file *truncation* via `git rev-list --output`) is rated Medium. `--prefix` supplies full content control, so it sits at or above the former. --- Instance 2 — `TagReference.create()`: arbitrary file read `git/refs/tag.py:88` forwards `kwargs` into `git tag` with no guard, and the signature advertises the passthrough: ```python def create(cls, repo, path, reference="HEAD", logmsg=None, force=False, kwargs): """... :param kwargs: Additional keyword arguments to be passed to :manpage:`git-tag(1)`. """ ``` `git tag` accepts `-F ` / `--file=`, which reads the tag message from an arbitrary path. The annotated tag object stores that content and GitPython returns it to the caller via `TagReference.tag.message`, so the file contents come back in-band. Reproduction ```python from git import Repo from git.refs.tag import TagReference t = TagReference.create(Repo("/path/to/repo"), "x", force=True, a=True, F="/etc/passwd") print(t.tag.message) ``` Observed (`poc/poc_tag_F.py`), reading a canary file outside the repository: ``` [ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised >>> tag message recovered from arbitrary path: 'TAG-READ-CANARY-98765\nsecond-line-secret' ``` Impact is a read at the privileges of the process. I am not claiming code execution for this instance. The signing options (`-s`, `-u`/`--local-user`) do invoke gpg from the same unguarded kwargs, but I did not develop that into command execution and make no claim about it. --- Sweep results — the other 12 sites Reported so the fix can be scoped once rather than per report. `poc/sweep.py` reproduces this list. | Call site | git command | Assessment | |---|---|---| | `IndexFile.from_tree()` | `read-tree` | `--index-output=` looked reachable but is neutralised: GitPython appends its own `--index-output` after the caller's kwargs and git honours the last occurrence. Verified — victim file unchanged (`poc/poc_readtree.py`) | | `IndexFile.remove()` | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found | | `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same | | `HEAD.reset()` | `reset` | same | | `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same | | `Head.delete()`, `RemoteReference.delete()` | `branch` | no path-taking option found | | `Repo.merge_base()` | `merge-base` | no path-taking option found | | `Repo._get_untracked_files()` | `status` | no path-taking option found | | `Remote.set_url()`, `Remote.create()`, `Remote.update()` | `remote` | URL handling already addressed by GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67 | Suggested remediation Immediate: add `allow_unsafe_options: bool = False` to both methods and gate `Git._option_candidates(args, kwargs)` against new lists — `unsafe_git_checkout_index_options = ["--prefix"]` (consider `--temp`) and `unsafe_git_tag_options = ["--file", "-F"]` (consider `-s`, `-u`/`--local-user`, `--cleanup`) — matching the pattern used in `Repo.archive()` and `Commit.count()`. Structural: this defect has now been fixed four times in four places (`Repo.archive()`, `Git.ls_remote()`, `Commit.count()`, and the two here), because the guard is opt-in per method: every new `**kwargs`-forwarding API starts unguarded and stays that way until someone reports it. Enforcing the check centrally in `Git._call_process()` — each git invocation consults a per-command unsafe-option table unless the caller opts out — would make new call sites safe by default rather than by review, and would close the remaining sites in the table above at the same time. Disclosure Reported privately via GitHub private vulnerability reporting.