GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg Mautic Vulnerable to User Enumeration via Response Timing

• Packagist mautic/core: >= 4.4.0, < 4.4.17 → fixed in 4.4.17 • Packagist mautic/core: >= 5.0.0-alpha, < 5.2.8 → fixed in 5.2.8 • Packagist mautic/core: >= 6.0.0-alpha, < 6.0.5 → fixed in 6.0.5

Impact The attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks. Patches This vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not. Technical Details The vulnerability was caused by different response times when: • A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred) • An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred) The fix introduces a `TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator` that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing. Workarounds No workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version. References • https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account • https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146