GHSA-3gx8-q682-38mx OpenID Connect nonce generated but never validated — ID token replay attack

• Packagist roadiz/openid: >= 2.7.0, < 2.7.18 → fixed in 2.7.18 • Packagist roadiz/openid: >= 2.6.0, < 2.6.31 → fixed in 2.6.31 • Packagist roadiz/openid: >= 2.5.0, < 2.5.45 → fixed in 2.5.45 • Packagist roadiz/openid: < 2.3.43 → fixed in 2.3.43

Summary The `roadiz/openid` package generates an OIDC nonce in `OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate()` and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but never stores it and never validates it on the callback. The `OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory` validation chain does not include a nonce constraint, and `OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate()` never checks the nonce claim in the returned ID token against a stored value. Details In `src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php`, a nonce is created and sent to the IdP: ```php 'nonce' => $this->tokenGenerator->generateToken(), ``` However, this value is neither stored in session, cache, nor any other persistent store. In `src/OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory.php`, the JWT validation constraints are: • `LooseValidAt` (expiry) • `PermittedFor` (audience) • `IssuedBy` (issuer) • `HostedDomain` (optional) • `UserInfoEndpoint` (optional) No nonce constraint is present. In `src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php`, the `authenticate()` method validates the state CSRF token correctly (fixed in v2.7.10), but never retrieves a stored nonce or compares it against the `nonce` claim in the ID token. PoC 1. Obtain a valid ID token from a legitimate OIDC flow for a target user (e.g. via network interception, browser history leak, or referrer header exposure on a non-HTTPS redirect). 2. Replay the ID token: Since the nonce in the token is never cross-checked against a client-stored value, the token passes all validation constraints as long as it has not expired. 3. Result: An attacker can authenticate as the victim within the ID token's validity window. Additionally, in an authorization code flow with multiple concurrent sessions, a malicious IdP or a compromised token endpoint could inject a token with a mismatched nonce, and the application would accept it silently. Impact • ID token replay attacks: Valid but intercepted tokens can be reused for authentication within their validity period. • Token injection attacks: A malicious or compromised identity provider can inject tokens across sessions without detection. • Affects any Roadiz application using the `roadiz/openid` package with OpenID Connect SSO. The OIDC Core 1.0 specification (Section 3.1.3.7) explicitly requires clients to verify the `nonce` claim if it was present in the authorization request.