GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-3h9h-qfvw-98hq OpenEXR Makes Use of Uninitialized Memory
LOW
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2025-64181
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- OpenEXR
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-457
- Reviewed
- 2026-04-06
Affected packages
• PyPI OpenEXR: >= 3.3.0, < 3.3.6 → fixed in 3.3.6
• PyPI OpenEXR: >= 3.4.0, < 3.4.3 → fixed in 3.4.3
Description
Summary
While fuzzing `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer`, Valgrind reports a conditional branch depending on uninitialized data inside `generic_unpack`. This indicates a use of uninitialized memory (CWE-457). The issue is reproducible with the current OSS-Fuzz harness and a single-file PoC.
Details
Environment:
• Tooling: `valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes`
• Target: `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer`
• OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS focal x86_64
• openexr version and Git-commit hash: ` openexr 3.4.2 | commit fd657e8a41e157e5841c7cc2e2a5efe094b069a1 (grafted, HEAD -> main, origin/main, origin/HEAD)`
Function: `generic_unpack`
Possible root cause (based on observed symptoms):
The unpacker is branching on bytes in a scratch buffer that were never written because the decode step didn’t fully populate it.
• The first use flagged is in `generic_unpack()`. That function reads from the decompressed/expanded pixel buffer to scatter data into the framebuffer. A “conditional jump depends on uninitialised value(s)” means it’s consulting bytes in that buffer before they were written.
• Valgrind says the uninitialised value “was created by a heap allocation (malloc)”, not the stack: this matches a per-tile/per-scanline decode scratch buffer allocated in `exr_decoding_run()`.
Valgrind Trace (top frames):
```bash
==454== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==454== at 0x4539BE: generic_unpack (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x44B85F: exr_decoding_run (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x38BC5F: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::TileProcess::run_decode(_priv_exr_context_t const*, int, Imf_4_0::FrameBuffer const*, std::__1::vector > const&) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x388BE1: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::Data::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x388619: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x353755: Imf_4_0::InputFile::Data::bufferedReadPixels(int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x352286: Imf_4_0::InputFile::readPixels(int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x3190FA: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::readMultiPart(Imf_4_0::MultiPartInputFile&, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== by 0x314C4D: Imf_4_0::checkOpenEXRFile(char const*, unsigned long, bool, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation at 0x483B7F3: malloc (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
```
PoC
In the attached archive, you will find:
• The executable used for our tests.
• The testcase used to trigger the bug.
To observe the bug, simply run the OSS-Fuzz helper script:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz.git
cd oss-fuzz
python3 infra/helper.py build_image openexr
python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers --sanitizer=none openexr
python3 infra/helper.py shell openexr
apt update && apt install -y valgrind
ulimit -n 65535
valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer /path/to/poc
```
Impact
• Undefined Behavior
• Potential crash
• Denial of Service
Credit: Aldo Ristori
archive0.zip
Update Note:
Other saved testcases from the fuzzing campaign trigger the same underlying bug, but with a different manifestation. So there is one root cause (missing post-decode validation / zero-init before any unpack), with different call-sites. Below there are several archives, formatted like the previous one, that reproduce the other test cases.
Other observed sinks (distinct manifestations of the same bug):
Deep pointers path:
generic_unpack_deep_pointers (deep scanline/tiled)
archive1.zip
Deep sample table path:
unpack_sample_table (deep scanline)
archive2.zip
Half conversion path:
half_to_float_buffer_f16c via unpack_half_to_float_3chan_planar
archive3.zip
Deep compositing:
CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels → ThreadPool::addTask → LineCompositeTask::execute
archive4.zip
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2025-64181 OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture… vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-457 Use of Uninitialized Variable weakness
References
- https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/security/advisories/GHSA-3h9h-qfvw-98hq web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64181 advisory
- https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr package
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024726/archive0.zip web
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024736/archive1.zip web
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024740/archive2.zip web
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024744/archive3.zip web
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024746/archive4.zip web