GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4 pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents

MEDIUM Published 2026-10-09 Modified 2026-10-09 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-107841
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
pacioli-guard
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-863
Reviewed
2026-10-09

Affected packages

• PyPI pacioli-guard: >= 0.9.6, < 0.10.0 → fixed in 0.10.0

Description

Impact `pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and act-bound marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to "ride" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own. The ride predicate returned `true` for every cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and no denial audit row. This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled: • `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). • That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc("Asset", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. • The chain reaches `depreciation.py:481` and then `asset_depreciation_schedule.py:215-217`, which calls `current_schedule.cancel()` on a `docstatus == 1`, submittable `Asset Depreciation Schedule` through the document lifecycle (only `should_not_cancel_depreciation_entries` is set, not `ignore_validate`, so `before_cancel` does fire and the ride is what admitted it). So one marker authorising `submit Sales Invoice X` cancelled a submitted document the human was never shown and never approved. Cancelling such a document reverses its ledger effect. The same shape exists behind wider grants, for example `Unreconcile Payment.on_submit` (`unreconcile_payment.py:59-64`), which walks a child table the caller fills and reaches `accounts/utils.py:857`/`:859` `gain_loss_je.cancel()` on submitted Journal Entries. Who is affected Only sites that had opted into consent gating: a credential must hold an `API Key Scope` with `require_consent` set. `pacioli-guard` is inert for principals without such a grant, and the credential-scoping floor (`auth_hooks`) is unaffected by this issue. The document-layer consent gate was first published in 0.9.6, which is the only released version in the affected range. Patches Fixed in 0.10.0. The ride now discriminates on the enclosing act: an undo may cascade into further undos, but a submit may not cascade into the cancellation of a document that already has a name, because that is an act a human could have been asked to approve. The custody stamp carries the act it was established for rather than a bare boolean, which is the state the vulnerable code lacked. Upgrading changes behavior. Any ERPNext flow where a submit cascades into a lifecycle cancel now requires a consent marker for that cancel as well as for the act itself. In ERPNext v16 that includes asset sale, partial-quantity asset sale, a credit note against an asset sale, Asset Repair capitalization, Asset Shift Allocation, Asset Value Adjustment, and `Unreconcile Payment`. To make that possible, the `X-Pacioli-Consent` header now accepts several markers separated by whitespace or commas; each remains bound to one document and one act, requires a different minter, and is spent exactly once. Workarounds On 0.9.6, remove `require_consent` from affected grants and rely on the credential-scoping floor alone, or scope governed credentials so they cannot submit documents whose controllers cancel other documents (for ERPNext slice-one, `Sales Invoice` with a populated item-row `asset` link is the known path). Neither is a substitute for upgrading. Residual, stated Under a governed cancel, a cascaded cancel of a pre-existing document still rides. That is load-bearing for undo (an ordinary invoice cancel makes ERPNext cancel the credit/debit notes and journals it generated, via `accounts_controller.py:2001-2005`) and cannot be narrowed without a signal that a cascaded cancel is a consequence of the enclosing document specifically. That justification does not describe everything the residual admits: at least one instance is caller-steered in the same shape as the issue fixed here, `Asset Repair.on_cancel` (`asset_repair.py:215-222`), which cancels a `Serial and Batch Bundle` named by a Link the caller fills in a child table. `pacioli-guard` also does not see writes that set `flags.ignore_validate` or that skip the document lifecycle entirely (raw SQL, `db_update`/`db_set` field writes); those residuals are published in the project's own documentation and are unchanged by this advisory. Credit Found by an internal adversarial review on 2026-07-28 that traced the predicate against frappe 16.28.0 and ERPNext v16 source rather than the project's own documentation. The prior code comment asserted that no such lever was known; that assertion had been written without the corresponding source sweep.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-107841 pacioli provides least-privilege governance and a governed agent broker for ERPNext. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization weakness

References