GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-3wp3-xxj9-5jqq Open WebUI: Cross-user model-list exposure via static cache key in get_all_models (aiocache key= vs key_builder= misuse)
LOW
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-59213
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- open-webui
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-524
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-24
Affected packages
• PyPI open-webui: >= 0.6.27, < 0.10.0 → fixed in 0.10.0
Description
Summary
The `get_all_models` handlers in `routers/openai.py` and `routers/ollama.py` intended to cache their permission-filtered model lists per user, but the `@cached` decorator was misconfigured: it passed a `key=` lambda instead of `key_builder=`. In aiocache 0.12.3 (the pinned version), `key=` is a static cache key — a callable passed there is used as a constant object, not invoked per call. As a result the per-user key was never computed, and all callers collided onto a single shared cache entry within the TTL window. During that window, one user's permission-filtered model list could be served to a different authenticated user, crossing the per-user authorization boundary.
Impact
• Boundary crossed: Confidentiality (cross-user). A caller can receive the model list scoped to a *different* security principal than themselves.
• A user (or admin, or — depending on endpoint reachability — anonymous caller) who populates the cache causes the next caller within the TTL to receive *that* list rather than their own permission-filtered one.
• What's disclosed is the set of models another principal can access, including potentially the existence and naming of models restricted from the receiving user.
• Exposure is incidental and timing-dependent, not attacker-controlled: the leaked entry is whatever the most recent caller populated within `MODELS_CACHE_TTL` (default 1 second), and the attacker cannot select the victim or force a target's list into the cache.
Affected component
• `backend/open_webui/routers/openai.py` — `get_all_models` (~line 488)
• `backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py` — `get_all_models` (~line 302)
Both decorated with `@cached(ttl=MODELS_CACHE_TTL, key=lambda ...)`. No other `@cached(... key=lambda ...)` misuse was found elsewhere in the backend.
Root cause
aiocache 0.12's `@cached` treats `key=` as a static key; the per-call hook is `key_builder=` with signature `key_builder(func, *args, **kwargs)`. Passing a callable to `key=` uses the callable object itself as a constant key, so every invocation resolved to the same entry and the intended per-`user.id` namespacing never occurred.
Reproduction (default config)
1. On a default deployment, configure at least two users with *different* model-access permissions (e.g. one model restricted to user A).
2. As user A, request the model list (populates the shared cache entry).
3. Within `MODELS_CACHE_TTL` (default 1s), as user B, request the model list.
4. User B receives user A's permission-filtered list, including models B is not permitted to see.
Remediation
Replace `key=` with `key_builder=` at both call sites and adjust the lambda to take the function as its first argument:
```python
@cached(
ttl=MODELS_CACHE_TTL,
key_builder=lambda _func, request, user=None: (
f'openai_all_models_{user.id}' if user else 'openai_all_models'
),
)
```
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-59213 Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-524 Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information weakness
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-3wp3-xxj9-5jqq web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59213 advisory
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/25783 web
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/0fc630b34b2899599dabffffa012afd47599aa75 web
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui package
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0 web