GHSA-434m-5hcj-pxf3 GraphQL Tools: Per-request connection parameters persist into later users' WebSocket authentications

• npm @graphql-tools/executor-legacy-ws: < 1.1.36 → fixed in 1.1.36

Stale authentication state in `@graphql-tools/executor-legacy-ws`: per-request `extensions.connectionParams` persist in executor closure state and are replayed in a later caller's `connection_init` Report metadata | Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Package | `@graphql-tools/executor-legacy-ws` (npm, `pkg:npm/%40graphql-tools/executor-legacy-ws`) | | Repository | https://github.com/ardatan/graphql-tools | | Component | `buildWSLegacyExecutor` (`packages/executors/legacy-ws/src/index.ts`) | | Vulnerability class | Stale authentication state / credential reuse across requests | | Verified against | Commit `b5d1c36ebb8ed3868260ffee5bbcbb423ad5c1f1`; npm release `1.1.33` installed and exercised. During validation the same behaviour was also observed on the current latest release `1.1.35`, and the unreset closure is still present on `master`. | | API surface | Public documented API (`buildWSLegacyExecutor`, and `request.extensions.connectionParams` on the returned executor) | | Affected in default configuration | Yes — the factory returns a general, reusable `Executor` with no per-identity or single-use restriction, and no supported teardown clears the retained parameters. | Version note: the originally recorded affected range was `"}` gets the victim's `Authorization` retained alongside its own tenant, i.e. an attacker-chosen tenant authenticated with someone else's bearer token. Scoring note: not scored. No CVSS vector accompanies this finding, and exploitability depends on the consuming application's data flow rather than on the library alone. Consumers that construct a fresh executor per request are not affected — the in-repository `UrlLoader` wrapper (`packages/loaders/url/src/index.ts:172-182`) builds a new executor for each request and therefore does not exhibit the persistence. The exposure is to applications that use the exported factory directly and share the executor. Preconditions 1. One executor instance created by `buildWSLegacyExecutor` is reused across requests belonging to different users or authorization contexts. 2. The application uses the explicitly supported `extensions.connectionParams` field to carry per-request downstream identity. This field is documented only by the source comment at line 91, which says additional connection params can be supplied through extensions but does not warn that values persist into later requests. 3. The first operation's socket is closed before the later operation opens a new one. This is the normal path, not an edge case: the `COMPLETE` handler calls `cleanupWebsocket()` after every operation. 4. Attacker capability required: the ability to make a request through the sharing application — in a gateway, a remote user controls whether they authenticate and which subscription they ask for, and an anonymous request naturally leaves the `connectionParams` key absent. 5. The later request omits at least one sensitive key rather than overwriting every prior key (`Object.assign` merges, it does not replace). This does not require non-standard usage, monkey-patching, or unusual configuration: the affected path is the documented `extensions.connectionParams` feature on the package's public API, and the library does not document per-request credential isolation as a caller responsibility. Validation confirmed that the library's own documented teardown, `executorSymbol.dispose` (bound to `cleanupWebsocket`), does not clear the state either — no supported API resets it. Data flow 1. Source — a victim `ExecutionRequest` supplies `extensions.connectionParams`, commonly an `Authorization` or tenant token (`packages/executors/legacy-ws/src/index.ts:90-100`). 2. Propagation — `Object.assign` stores those keys in the closure-scoped `executorConnectionParams` (`index.ts:32`, `index.ts:97-100`). 3. Propagation — `cleanupWebsocket` terminates the socket but does not reset `executorConnectionParams` (`index.ts:78-88`); the attacker's later request omits `connectionParams`, so the conditional update is skipped and the old keys remain ([`index.ts:93-101`](https://github.com/ardatan/graphql-tools/blob/b5d1c36ebb8ed3868260ffee5bbcbb423ad5c1f1/packa…