GHSA-4625-4j76-fww9 OpenTelemetry's disk retry default temp path enables local blob injection via OTLP Exporter

• NuGet OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol: >= 1.8.0, < 1.15.3 → fixed in 1.15.3

Summary The OTLP disk retry feature in `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol` silently fell back to `Path.GetTempPath()` when `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk` was set but `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` was not configured. The exporter stored and loaded `*.blob` files under fixed, signal-named subdirectories (`traces`, `metrics`, `logs`) beneath that shared temporary root path. On multi-user systems where the temporary directory is accessible to other local accounts, this exposed three attack surfaces: • Blob injection (integrity): an attacker could write crafted `*.blob` files into the predictable path; the exporter picks them up on the next retry cycle and forwards them to the configured OTLP endpoint under the application's identity. • Telemetry disclosure (confidentiality): an attacker reads `*.blob` files written by the application between export failures, recovering encoded telemetry payloads (spans, metric data points, log records). • Resource exhaustion (availability): an attacker deposits numerous or oversized blob files, degrading retry-loop performance or consuming disk space. Details Preconditions 1. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY` is set to `disk`. 2. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` is not set, causing the exporter to resolve the blob storage root using the `System.IO.Path.GetTempPath()` API. 3. A local attacker has read or write access to the process' temporary directory (e.g., `/tmp` on Linux, or `%TEMP%` on a multi-user Windows installation). Exploit path 1. A target application starts with `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk` and no explicit blob directory. The exporter resolves the storage root to `Path.GetTempPath()`, producing paths such as `%TEMP%\traces`, `%TEMP%\metrics`, and `%TEMP%\logs` (or `/tmp/traces` etc. on Linux). 2. Injection scenario: before or during the application's retry window, an attacker writes crafted `*.blob` files into one of those signal subdirectories. On the next retry interval (by default every 60 seconds), `OtlpExporterPersistentStorageTransmissionHandler` scans the directory, loads the attacker-supplied blobs, and forwards them to the configured OTLP endpoint using the application's identity and transport credentials. 3. Disclosure scenario: the attacker reads `*.blob` files that the application wrote after a transient export failure, recovering the full serialized telemetry payloads (spans, metric data points, or log records in Protobuf encoding). 5. DoS scenario: the attacker deposits a large number of oversized blob files in the temporary subdirectories, causing the retry loop to consume excess CPU/IO processing them, potentially exhausting available disk space. Mitigations If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible: 1. Avoid enabling disk retry in shared environments. 2. Configure a dedicated directory with strict ACL/ownership and least privilege. 3. Ensure the directory is not shared across tenants/users. 4. Monitor for unexpected `*.blob` files or abnormal retry backlog growth. Resources • #7106