GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel

MEDIUM Published 2026-10-02 Modified 2026-10-02 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
trigger.dev
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-639
Reviewed
2026-10-02

Affected packages

• npm trigger.dev: < 4.5.6 → fixed in 4.5.6

Description

Summary Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple environments (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`, and per-PR `preview` branches), each with its own secret API key — the environment is a trust boundary (a `dev`/preview/CI key is lower-trust than a `prod` key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment (`where: { friendlyId, runtimeEnvironmentId: auth.environment.id }`). The deployment cancel path does not. `DeploymentService.getDeployment()` scopes the lookup by `projectId` only — never `environmentId` — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including production. The deployment GET route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is 404'd when trying to read a prod deployment can nonetheless cancel it. That asymmetry is the bug. Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current `main`). Affects self-hosted and cloud. Root cause `apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.cancel.ts` authenticates to an environment and calls `deploymentService.cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv, deploymentId, ...)`. `apps/webapp/app/v3/services/deployment.server.ts`: ```ts public cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv: Pick, friendlyId, ...) { return this.getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, friendlyId) // projectId only .andThen(validateDeployment) // rejects only FINAL statuses .andThen(cancelDeployment); // updateMany -> status CANCELED } private getDeployment(projectId: string, friendlyId: string) { return this._prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId, projectId }, // ` — it discards the environment identity. `validateDeployment` blocks only `FINAL_DEPLOYMENT_STATUSES`, so any in-progress deployment (`PENDING`/`INSTALLING`/`BUILDING`/`DEPLOYING`) is cancellable. Contrast — the correctly env-scoped sibling `api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.ts` (GET): ```ts const deployment = await prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: deploymentId, environmentId: authenticatedEnv.id }, // env-scoped }); ``` Reads are env-scoped; the cancel mutation is not. The same `getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, …)` helper also backs the deployment *progress* methods (`deployment.server.ts:172,329`), so the projectId-only scope is a small class. Runtime PoC (proven on the self-host stack) Seeded one project with a `prod` env (key `tr_prod_…`) and a `dev` env (key `tr_dev_…`) and one `WorkerDeployment` (`deployment_pocvictim`, status `DEPLOYING`) in the prod env. As the dev key: ``` status BEFORE : DEPLOYING GET /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim (dev key) -> 404 (env-scoped read DENIES it) POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim/cancel (dev key) -> 204 status AFTER : CANCELED (prod deploy canceled by the dev key) CONTROL: same cancel with a DIFFERENT project's key -> 404 (projectId scope blocks cross-project) ``` The dev key cannot *read* the prod deployment (404) yet *cancels* it (204 → CANCELED); a different project's key is correctly 404'd — so the gap is precisely cross-environment within a project.

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key weakness

References