GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4 Open WebUI: Jupyter code execution works despite `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false` — feature gate bypassed

• PyPI open-webui: < 0.8.12 → fixed in 0.8.12

Summary The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes. Details The admin configuration correctly shows `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false`. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container. PoC Verified against Open WebUI v0.8.11 (latest) Docker on 2026-03-25. Setup: Jupyter server connected, `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false` confirmed in admin config. ```bash Step 1: Verify code execution is disabled curl -s http://target:8080/api/v1/configs/code_execution \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" Returns: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION": false, ...} Step 2: Execute code anyway — gate bypassed curl -s -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/utils/code/execute \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"code":"import os; print(os.popen(\"id\").read())"}' ``` Verified output: ``` Config: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION":false,"CODE_EXECUTION_ENGINE":"jupyter",...} execute_status=200 execute_body={"stdout":"OPEN-WEBUI-SSRF-SECRET","stderr":"","result":""} ``` The PoC read the internal secret service content via Jupyter — despite `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The Jupyter container has network access to internal services, making this both a code execution bypass and an SSRF vector. Impact Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary Python code in the Jupyter container, even when the admin has explicitly disabled code execution: • Arbitrary code execution in the Jupyter container (read files, spawn processes) • Network access to all internal Docker services from the Jupyter container • Data exfiltration from internal services • The admin's security configuration (`ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`) is silently ineffective • Users who are told "code execution is disabled" have a false sense of security Resolution Fixed in commit 6d736d3c5, first released in v0.8.12. The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` handler in `backend/open_webui/routers/utils.py` now checks `request.app.state.config.ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION` before dispatching to the Jupyter engine and returns 403 with `FEATURE_DISABLED('Code execution')` when the admin has disabled the flag. The retrieval-side code path was gated in the same commit. Users on `>= 0.8.12` are not affected.