GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-48jh-3gj7-fg8v vLLM: ReDoS via structured_outputs.regex in the lm-format-enforcer backend (no compile timeout) — missed sibling of GHSA-rwxx-mrjm-wc2m

MEDIUM Published 2026-09-04 Modified 2026-09-04 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-73556
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
vllm
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-1333, CWE-400
Reviewed
2026-09-04

Affected packages

• PyPI vllm: < 0.26.0 → fixed in 0.26.0

Description

Summary The fix for `GHSA-rwxx-mrjm-wc2m` ("ReDoS via `structured_outputs.regex` compiled without timeout") wrapped the regex compile in the xgrammar and outlines backends with `compile_regex_with_timeout` (and, for outlines, `validate_regex_is_buildable`). The lm-format-enforcer backend was left unguarded: it compiles the attacker-supplied regex with no timeout and no buildability check. A single request with a catastrophic regex hangs the structured-output compile step and stalls the engine worker (denial of service). Affected code (HEAD d6d39c1) `vllm/v1/structured_output/backend_lm_format_enforcer.py`: • line 110: `character_level_parser = lmformatenforcer.RegexParser(grammar_spec)` — builds an `interegular` FSM from the attacker regex synchronously, no timeout. • line 155: `validate_structured_output_request_lm_format_enforcer` returns immediately on `if so_params.regex:` — no validation. Sibling backends that WERE patched by GHSA-rwxx: • `backend_xgrammar.py:92` → `compile_regex_with_timeout(...)`. • `backend_outlines.py:65` → `compile_regex_with_timeout(...)` (plus `validate_regex_is_buildable`). lm-format-enforcer uses the same `interegular` DFA-construction primitive the advisory cites for the outlines backend. Reproduction (runtime-verified against the sink) The sink `lmformatenforcer.RegexParser()` was exercised directly (this is exactly what the backend calls): ``` baseline '[0-9]{3}' -> 0.0002 s attacker '(a{1,300}){300}' -> DID NOT COMPLETE in 20 s (one core pegged at 100% in interegular FSM construction) ``` End-to-end: start `vllm serve --structured-outputs-config '{"backend":"lm-format-enforcer"}'`, then `POST /v1/completions` with `{"structured_outputs":{"regex":"(a{1,300}){300}"}, ...}`. The request never returns; because grammar compile runs in the engine's structured-output path, concurrent requests stall = worker-level DoS. The identical request against the outlines backend is bounded by `compile_regex_with_timeout` and returns a clean error. Impact Unauthenticated denial of service (vLLM ships with no authentication by default). One request pegs a CPU core and blocks the structured-output engine path. Reachability precondition: the operator must have selected `backend=lm-format-enforcer` via `--structured-outputs-config` (the default is `auto` → xgrammar). This is the same opt-in tier as the outlines backend that GHSA-rwxx already covered. Suggested remediation Route the lm-format-enforcer regex compile (`backend_lm_format_enforcer.py:110`) through the same `compile_regex_with_timeout` guard already applied to the xgrammar and outlines backends, and reject un-buildable / oversized patterns in `validate_structured_output_request_lm_format_enforcer`.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-73556 vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity weakness
  • CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption weakness

References