GHSA-4hf8-5mjm-rfgq Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication

• npm line-desktop-mcp: < 1.1.2 → fixed in 1.1.2

Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication Summary `line-desktop-mcp` supports a `--http-mode` Streamable HTTP transport for use with clients such as n8n. In this mode the server binds to `0.0.0.0` and exposes the MCP `/mcp` endpoint without an MCP-layer authentication check. Any network client that can reach the port can initialize a session, list tools, and call tools that read LINE Desktop chat history or send LINE messages through the already logged-in desktop application. This is High for deployments where the HTTP port is reachable beyond the local host, because the server acts with the user authority of the logged-in LINE Desktop session. It is lower if the listener is strictly firewalled to trusted local clients. Affected version Repository: `dtwang/line-desktop-mcp` Current source checked: `fbed0d2d3048e63f48a356a1267ed8ec5e78f3ae` on `main`, committed 2026-05-14. Published npm package checked: `[email protected]`. Source evidence `README.md` documents Streamable HTTP mode: ```text npx line-desktop-mcp@latest --http-mode --port 3000 ``` The same README documents MCP endpoints at `/mcp` and explains that this mode is intended for clients such as n8n. `src/server.js` registers LINE Desktop tools including: • `get_line_chatroom_history_default` • `get_line_chatroom_history_long` • `get_line_chatroom_history_short` • `send_message_manual` • `send_message_auto` Those tool handlers call into the desktop automation layer: `getChatHistory(...)` and `sendChatMessage(...)`. In HTTP mode, `src/server.js` creates an Express app and Streamable HTTP transport, accepts POSTs to `/mcp`, creates sessions, connects the transport to the MCP server, and calls `transport.handleRequest(...)`. I did not find an authentication or bearer-token check before session creation or tool invocation. The listener is explicitly network-bound: ```js app.listen(port, 0.0.0.0, () => { console.error(`LINE Desktop MCP Server running on Streamable HTTP mode`); console.error(` Local: http://127.0.0.1:${port}${endpoint}`); console.error(` Network: http://0.0.0.0:${port}${endpoint}`); }); ``` Vulnerability chain 1. A user starts the server with `--http-mode --port 3000`. 2. The server binds on `0.0.0.0:3000`, not only loopback. 3. A network client reaches `/mcp` and sends the normal MCP initialize request. 4. The server creates a Streamable HTTP session without authenticating the caller. 5. The caller can list and invoke LINE Desktop tools. 6. Tool calls execute through the logged-in LINE Desktop application on the user workstation. Impact An unauthenticated network client can read LINE chat history through the MCP history tools and can send LINE messages through the send-message tools, including `send_message_auto` when the tool call requests immediate sending. The attacker does not need LINE credentials or a LINE API token; they only need network reachability to the MCP HTTP port. The practical impact is disclosure of private LINE conversations and unauthorized messages sent as the logged-in desktop user. Suggested fix Require authentication before accepting Streamable HTTP MCP sessions or tool calls. For example: • require a bearer token or local secret when `--http-mode` is used; • bind HTTP mode to `127.0.0.1` by default unless the operator explicitly opts into network exposure; • refuse to start `0.0.0.0` HTTP mode without authentication; • document that `host.docker.internal` / n8n setups must still authenticate to the MCP server. A defense-in-depth improvement would also keep `send_message_auto` disabled unless explicitly enabled by a server-side flag, because it converts MCP tool access into immediate message sending as the desktop user.