GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w compliance-trestle - jinja has an Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal

• PyPI compliance-trestle: >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.3 → fixed in 4.0.3 • PyPI compliance-trestle: < 3.12.2 → fixed in 3.12.2

Relevant Products/Components: • `trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py` • `trestle author jinja` --- Detailed Description: The `-o/--output` argument in `trestle author jinja` allows writing files outside the intended workspace. The application does not properly validate: • `../` • `..\` • absolute paths This allows arbitrary file write to attacker-controlled locations. Vulnerable code: ```python output_file = trestle_root / r_output_file ``` An attacker can overwrite files such as: • `.github/workflows/*.yml` • `.git/hooks/*` • user writable config files This can lead to CI/CD compromise or local code execution. --- Steps To Reproduce: 1. Clone the repository: ```bash git clone https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle.git cd compliance-trestle ``` 2. Create template: ```bash echo "hello" > template.j2 ``` 3. Run: ```powershell trestle author jinja -i template.j2 -o "subdir\..\..\..\..\..\poc.txt" ``` 4. Observe: ```powershell dir E:\poc.txt ``` The file is written outside the repository workspace. --- Browsers Verified In: Not browser related. Tested on: • Windows 11 • Python 3.13 --- Supporting Material/References: Affected file: ```text trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py ``` Successfully verified: • directory traversal using `../` • Windows traversal using `..\` • arbitrary file write outside workspace --- Access Vector Required for Exploitation: Local --- Vulnerability Exists in Default Configuration?: Yes --- Is the exploitation trivial or does it involve a multi-step process that may depend on user/victim interaction?: Trivial. Single command execution. --- Exploitation Requires Authentication?: No --- Under what privileges does the vulnerable service or component run?: Runs with privileges of the user executing the `trestle` command. Impact An attacker can write files outside the intended workspace directory and overwrite sensitive files writable by the current user. Possible impacts include: • overwriting `.github/workflows/*.yml` to execute attacker-controlled GitHub Actions workflows • overwriting `.git/hooks/*` for local code execution • modifying user configuration files such as `.bashrc` • tampering with repository files and generated compliance artifacts In CI/CD environments, this may result in execution of attacker-controlled commands on build runners.