GHSA-53fp-9jmv-227g SiYuan: Outline state for any document, including documents forbidden to readers, is returned by /api/storage/getOutlineStorage with no access check

• Go github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel: < 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 → fixed in 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2

Summary `/api/storage/getOutlineStorage` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and performs no authorization of any kind. Given a document identifier it returns that document's stored outline state, regardless of the document's publish tier. The two write endpoints for the same data, `setOutlineStorage` and `removeOutlineStorage`, both carry `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly`. Only the read path is unguarded. Details Routes. `kernel/api/router.go:103` on master, `:108` on the development branch: ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/getOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, getOutlineStorage) ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/setOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, setOutlineStorage) ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/removeOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, removeOutlineStorage) ``` Handler. `kernel/api/storage.go:466` on the development branch, `:469` on master, identical. It binds `docID` and calls `model.GetOutlineStorage(docID)`, which iterates the stored outline documents and returns the entry whose `DocID` matches. There is no filter function on this path at all: no `*gin.Context`, no publish-access check, no password check, no visibility check. The caller supplies the identifier and receives the payload. What is stored. `type OutlineDoc { DocID string; Data map[string]any }`. The client writes it from `app/src/layout/dock/Outline.ts:742`: ```js fetchPost("/api/storage/setOutlineStorage", { docID: this.blockId, val: { expandIds: this.tree.getExpandIds() } }); ``` So the payload is the set of heading block identifiers the administrator has expanded in the outline pane for that document. Secondarily, an empty result versus a populated one indicates whether the administrator has ever worked with that document's outline. Not covered by the local-storage fix. Commit `4daee87d4` addressed `getLocalStorage`, `getLocalStorageVal`, `getLocalStorageVals` and `FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess`. The word "outline" does not appear in that diff. That filter was under-inclusive; this endpoint has no filter to be under-inclusive. Proof of Concept Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, `Publish.Auth.Enable` false, anonymous client with no auth header. An administrator wrote outline state through the authenticated port: ``` POST /api/storage/setOutlineStorage {"docID":"","val":{"openIDs":["",""]}} → {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null} ``` The same value read back anonymously: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/storage/getOutlineStorage {"docID":""} → {"code":0,"msg":"","data":{"openIDs":["",""]}} ``` With that document set to the forbidden tier, on the same anonymous session: | Endpoint | Result | |---|---| | `getDoc` (control) | `protyle-password--forbidden` placeholder, content withheld | | `getOutlineStorage` | full payload returned | The control establishes that the session is correctly denied the document itself. Impact An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, retrieves the administrator's outline state for any document whose identifier they hold, including documents in the forbidden tier that the publish filters otherwise withhold entirely. The disclosed values are heading block identifiers, usable as input to other endpoints, and the presence or absence of an entry indicates whether the administrator has worked with that document. No document text is returned. Confidentiality only. Suggested fix Gate the read path as the write paths already are. Either add `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly` at the route, matching `setOutlineStorage` and `removeOutlineStorage`, or pass `*gin.Context` into `GetOutlineStorage` and apply `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` against the requested `docID` before returning anything.