GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist
GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-47212
- Ecosystem
- Packagist
- Packages
- symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
- Weaknesses
- CWE-306, CWE-347
- Reviewed
- 2026-05-29
Affected packages
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40 → fixed in 6.4.40
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12 → fixed in 7.4.12
• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12 → fixed in 8.0.12
• Packagist symfony/twilio-notifier: >= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40 → fixed in 6.4.40
• Packagist symfony/twilio-notifier: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12 → fixed in 7.4.12
• Packagist symfony/twilio-notifier: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12 → fixed in 8.0.12
Description
Description
The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.
As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts any POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.
Resolution
`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.
When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.
Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 6.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-47212 Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq web
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/8545fb2af6c07dfb5ef0fc8d9bccf86db2c94356 web
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-47212.yaml web
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/twilio-notifier/CVE-2026-47212.yaml web
- https://github.com/symfony/symfony package
- https://symfony.com/cve-2026-47212 web