GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist

GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification

MEDIUM Published 2026-05-29 Modified 2026-05-29 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-47212
Ecosystem
Packagist
Packages
symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
Weaknesses
CWE-306, CWE-347
Reviewed
2026-05-29

Affected packages

• Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40 → fixed in 6.4.40 • Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12 → fixed in 7.4.12 • Packagist symfony/symfony: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12 → fixed in 8.0.12 • Packagist symfony/twilio-notifier: >= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40 → fixed in 6.4.40 • Packagist symfony/twilio-notifier: >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12 → fixed in 7.4.12 • Packagist symfony/twilio-notifier: >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12 → fixed in 8.0.12

Description

Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts any POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in. Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed. The patch for this issue is available here for branch 6.4. Credits Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-47212 Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality weakness
  • CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature weakness

References