GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-647h-p824-99w7 @grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- @grackle-ai/mcp
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-284
- Reviewed
- 2026-03-25
Affected packages
• npm @grackle-ai/mcp: < 0.70.2 → fixed in 0.70.2
Description
Impact
The `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.
This is a cross-workspace data leakage vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.
Affected code:
• `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)
• `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)
• `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)
Contrast with correct implementation: `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.
Design Note
Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be opt-in with explicit grants, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:
• Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings
• A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens
• Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context
Patches
Fix: Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:
```typescript
const resolvedWorkspaceId =
authContext?.type === "scoped"
? authContext.workspaceId ?? ""
: workspaceId ?? "";
```
When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.
Workarounds
Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.
References
• CWE-284: Improper Access Control
• File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`
• File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-284 Improper Access Control weakness